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Commodity Market Manipulation Law:




Evidence abounds that commodity market manipulation law in the
United States is extraordinarily confused.' For example, courts and
administrative law judges (ALJs) have violently attacked the reasoning
underlying precedent-setting cases.2 Commodity market regulators have
publicly lamented the acute difficulty of determining whether a mampula-
tion has occurred.' Legal scholars have argued that the existing law
borders on the chaotic. In the extreme, some have claimed that judicial
* Assistant Professor of Business Economics and Public Policy, School of Business
Administration, University of Michigan. Ph.D 1987, University of Chicago; M.B.A. 1983,
University of Chicago; B.A. 1981, University of Chicago. This paper benefitted from the
comments of the participants at the Law and Economics Seminar at the University of
Michigan Law School, Rich Friedman, and my colleagues Scott Masten, Francine
LaFontaine, and Valerie Suslow. I am responsible for all remaining errors.
1. Section 9 of the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) makes manipulation or attempted
manipulation a felony 7 U.S.C. § 13(a)(2) (Supp. V 1993). Section 5 of the CEA requires
Boards of Trade (i.e., commodity exchanges) to prevent the "manipulation of prices and the
cornering of any commodity " Id. § 7(4). The CEA was originally titled "The Grain Futures
Act," which was passed in 1922. Id. § 1 (1988).
2. The AIJ in David G. Henner, 30 Agric. Dec. 1151 (1971), included a 28 page
appendix excoriating the reasoning in Volkart Brothers, Inc. v Freeman, 311 F.2d 52 (5th
Cir. 1962), even though Henner was not a market power manipulation case. David G.
Henner, 30 Agric. Dec. at 1264-91. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit also pointedly criticized Volkart. See generally Cargill, Inc. v Hardin, 452 F.2d
1154 (8th Cir. 1971).
3. See Vincent W Kosuga, 19 Agric. Dec. 603, 615 (1960) ("Drawing a line between
legitimate trading and trading with manipulative intent is sometimes a very difficult task.").
Similarly, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) noted the "lack of objective
standards for identifying and preventing potentially disruptive situations m futures markets."
43 Fed. Reg. 15,438, 15,439 (1978).
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action is incapable of deterring manipulation and that more thorough
regulatory restrictions on trader conduct are therefore necessary 4
The suggested regulatory remedies to judicial failure (e.g., more
restrictive position limits, more aggressive market surveillance, and
preventative intervention) are troubling because they are so broad that they
will inevitably demoralize legitimate activity in futures markets to some
(perhaps considerable) degree. This is costly For example, position limits
may limit the ability to shift risk from the very risk averse to the very risk
tolerant (a primary function of futures markets) because the latter are
constrained from taking very large positions. This result compromises the
hedging function of futures markets and may also increase price volatility
Moreover, it is difficult to adjust position limits in a discriminating fashion
in response to changed economic circumstances. As another example,
government intervention into the market intended to prevent a manipulation
(e.g., an order requiring trading for liquidation only) is by necessity based
on incomplete information about intentions and market power.5 As a
result of this paucity of information, the regulator may intervene when
intervention is inappropriate or may fail to intervene when a manipulation
is indeed in progress.
Given these potentially substantial costs of alternative means of
mampulation deterrence, it is decidedly preferable to establish a legal
standard that avoids the pitfalls of the existing law and reliably distinguish-
es manipulative conduct from legitimate uses of futures markets. This
standard could be employed after an alleged manipulation, when informa-
tion about the effects of and intentions behind traders' actions is most
complete. Moreover, since it would be employed only when a mampula-
tion is suspected, unlike position limits and other ex ante restrictions on
traders' activities, this standard would not constrain legitimate activities
when the threat of manipulation is small. Such an ex post standard avoids
the problem of throwing the baby out with the bath water by contributing
to the effective deterrence of damaging forms of trader conduct without
impairing the legitimate activities of market users.
4. See George A. Davidson, Squeezes and Corners: A Structural Approach, 40 Bus.
LAW 1283, 1296-98 (1985); Jerry W Markham, Manipulation of Commodity Futures
Prices-The Unprosecutable Crime, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 281, 361-76 (1991).
5. Section 8a(9) of the CEA gives the CFTC the power to intervene in contract markets
in the event of "threatened or actual market manipulation and comers." 7 U.S.C. § 12a(9)
(1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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In this Article, I formulate such a standard by relying upon a firm
understanding of the economic implications of market manipulation
developed in my earlier work on the subject. I show that such reliance
allows the construction of a robust, practical legal standard that accurately
discriminates between competitive and anticompetitive uses of the futures
market delivery process. That is, I combine the implications of a formal
model of the economic effects of manipulation and classical statistical
methodology in order to show that manipulation is not an "unprosecutable
crime," as some have argued.
The basic approach that I present in this Article is as follows. The
most important form of manipulation consists of the exercise of market
power in a commodity market. Economic theory predicts how prices and
quantities behave during a manipulation. In particular, it demonstrates that
prices and quantities behave differently during a manipulation than they do
when traders do not exercise market power. Thus, it is possible to use data
on prices and classical statistical techniques to test the following hypothe-
sis: "A manipulation did not occur in Market X at time T" Rejection of
this hypothesis creates a presumption that some trader(s) exercised market
power in X at time T Economic theory also describes how traders must
behave in order to comer a commodity market. Thus, by comparing the
observed behavior of traders to this predicted behavior, it is possible to
identify who exercised market power. In sum, I show that because
manipulation is essentially an economic offense, standard economic tools
can be reliably employed to detect and deter it. Such a rigorous approach
avoids the numerous pitfalls inherent in the existing legal tests for
manipulation.
The remainder of this Article is organized as follows. Part II presents
a short description of futures markets. Part III provides a brief summary
of the economic analysis of long manipulation and lists several testable
implications of this conduct. Part IV uses the insights derived from the
economic analysis to examine critically manipulation case decisions and the
scholarly legal literature on manipulation. Part V builds upon the economic
analysis to construct an alternative set of tests for manipulation to avoid the
glaring errors and logical inconsistencies inherent in the existing prece-
dents. Part VI provides a brief summary of the Article.
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I. Futures Markets: An Overview
As their name suggests, futures exchanges are centralized marketplaces
where traders buy and sell commodities for delivery in the future. For
example, in May 1995, an individual or firm can purchase or sell 5,000
bushels of soybeans for delivery in Chicago in November 1995 by
purchasing a futures contract traded on the Chicago Board of Trade
(CBOT). A seller of a futures contract is called a "short," and the buyer
is called a "long." Commodities traded in futures markets include
traditional physical commodities (e.g., corn, gold, cattle, and oil) and
financial assets (e.g., Treasury Bonds and stock indices).
Futures contracts are bought and sold in centralized trading "pits" in
an open outcry auction. Customers submit buy and sell orders for futures
contracts to brokerage firms. These firms transmit the orders to brokers
located in the pit. The brokers call out their desire to buy or sell, and other
traders in the pit compete to take the other side of the trade. The broker
accepts the best bid or offer made in the pit to fill his order. In addition to
trading for customers, some pit participants trade on their own account.
In order to limit negotiations in the futures pit to price alone, a futures
exchange standardizes all other terms of futures contracts. These terms
include when and where delivery must occur and the quantity and quality
of the commodity to be delivered.6 For example, the November 1995
soybean futures contract traded on the CBOT states that shorts must deliver
5,000 bushels of #2 quality soybeans in Chicago during the month of
November 1995. Shorts also have the option to deliver in Toledo and in
St. Louis at prices that differ by fixed amounts from the Chicago price.
Similarly, shorts have the option to deliver higher quality #1 soybeans and
receive a fixed price premium over the #2 soybeans for doing so. These
delivery options are intended largely to deter mampulation.
6. Some futures contracts are "cash settled." The S&P 500 contract traded on the
Chicago Mercantile Exchange is a well-known example of a cash settled contract. In this
contract, a short does not deliver the actual stocks that comprise the index in order to satisfy
his contractual obligation. Instead, the value of the stocks at the end of a contract month
determine a settlement price. The long and short close their contract by making cash
payments; the size of these payments and who pays whom depends upon the settlement price
and the price prevailing when the long and short entered the contract. Only delivery settled
contracts are susceptible to the kind of manipulation discussed in this Article, so I ignore cash
settled contracts hereafter.
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Contracts need not be closed by delivery A seller or buyer of a
contract can purchase or sell a contract prior to the end of the delivery
period. Upon doing so, the clearinghouse of the relevant futures exchange
nets the sale and purchase which leaves the trader with no obligation to
make or take delivery In fact, upwards of 95 % of futures contracts are
offset in this fashion. However, since a short or long must find a willing
seller or buyer in order to close his position, no trader can unilaterally
escape his contractual obligations. Thus, if a resolute buyer demands
delivery and refuses to sell all of her futures contracts, those who have sold
futures contracts to her have no choice but to comply or else face severe
penalties for default. As Part III shows, if delivery and default are
sufficiently costly, this ability to demand delivery may allow a large long
trader to manipulate the market.
II. The Economics of Commodity Market Manipulation
The manipulation of commodity markets has been a subject of intense
debate and interest since the birth of futures markets in the mid-mneteenth
century Despite the attention this issue has received, there is no consensus
definition on the meaning of "mampulation." An old-time cotton broker's
comment reveals how promiscuously the term has been applied: "The word
'mampulation' in its use is so broad as to include any operation in the
cotton market that does not suit the gentleman who is speaking at the
moment."7 Any analysis of manipulation must therefore begin with a
definition. In this Article, I define manipulation as follows:
Manipulation is the exercise of monopoly power in a futures market
and/or the cash market for the underlying commodity near the expiration
date of a futures contract. A long exercises market power by taking
delivery on so many futures contracts that shorts must acquire the
commodity from uneconomic locations in order to satisfy the long's
demands.'
7 2 FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, THE COTTON TRADE, S. Doc. No. 100, 68th Cong.,
Ist Sess. 148 (1924), mtcroformed on CIS No. 8242.(Congressional Info. Serv.).
8. More generally, one can replace the term "futures" with the term "derivative
security " Derivative securities include forward contracts and options. The Salomon
Brothers squeeze of the two-year Treasury Note m May 1991 is an example of a squeeze m
a derivative security market. In that case, the "when issued" and "repurchase" contracts were
squeezed. Both are forward contracts, as opposed to exchange traded futures contracts.
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Five considerations justify this limitation of the analysis of manipulation
to comers and squeezes. First, the exercise of market power m a commodity
market is universally recognized as a form of manipulation; there is no such
agreement for other forms of conduct so labeled.9 Indeed, the Commodity
Exchange Act (CEA) explicitly proscribes comers, although it also bans
other, unspecified kinds of manipulative conduct. 0 As a result, most of the
important manipulation cases involve a corner."1 Second, comers and
squeezes are historically important. Numerous market power manipulations
have occurred in the past, and these episodes have generated popular, legal,
and legislative responses.' 2 Third, economic theory implies that market
power manipulations help to make possible other sorts of conduct that are
sometimes deemed manipulative. To take an important example, market
power manipulation makes so-called "bear raids" (the sales of massive
9. Daniel Fischel and David Ross consider, but reject, the possibility that the exercise
of market power is the essence of manipulation. See Daniel R. Fischel & David J. Ross,
Should the Law Prohibit "Manipulation" in Financial Markets?, 105 HARv. L. REv. 503,544
n.182 (1991). Fischel and Ross argue that "the possibility of market power provides
incentives for traders who believe prices will rise to go long and incentives for shorts to
obtain deliverable supplies to alleviate possible shortages." Id. The theory that market power
has beneficial effects is specious because the possibility of market power gives too strong an
incentive to go long and leads to excessive efforts to obtain deliverable supplies. Fischel and
Ross also claim that "market power can arise from legitimate trades." Id. at 546. By this
they apparently mean that a trader can acquire a position (for hedging purposes, for instance)
with no manipulative intent, but exercise market power at contract expiration due to a
fortuitous change in circumstances between the time the trader buys and the time the contract
expires. This reasoning closely parallels that of several cases criticized heavily below. See
infra part IV.B. Thus, whereas Fischel and Ross appear to distinguish manipulative trading
from the exercise of market power at contract expiration, I consider market power to be a
particular type of manipulative conduct. My usage is more typical than that of Fischel and
Ross. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Monopoly, Manipulation, and the Regulation of Futures
Markets, 59 J. Bus. S103, S1 17-20 (1986) (identifying manipulation with exercise of market
power); Linda N. Edwards & Franklin R. Edwards, A Legal and Economic Analysis of
Manipulation in Futures Markets, 4 J. FUTURES MARKETS 333, 345 (1984) (same).
10. See 7 U.S.C. § 7(4) (Supp. V 1993) (requiring exchanges to prevent "manipulation
of prices and the cornering of any commodity").
11. For a list of manipulation cases brought under CEA, see Markham, supra note 4,
at 380-89. Of the 44 cases, 37 (84%) were market power manipulation cases. Id.
12. See JULIUS B. BAER & GEORGE P WOODRUFF, COMMODITY EXCHANGES 182-95
(1929); CEDRIC B. COWING, POPULISTS, PLUNGERS, AND PROGRESSIVES 3-24 (1965); JERRY
W MARKHAM, THE HISTORY OF COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING AND ITS REGULATION
3-34 (1987).
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numbers of futures contracts in order to depress prices) profitable."i
Fourth, the exercise of market power at contract expiration distorts market
prices prior to contract expiration and makes these prices more volatile and
less informative than they would be if no traders exercised market power.
14
Fifth, the exercise of market power at contract expiration distorts consump-
tion and production decisions, thereby creating deadweight losses.' 5 The
combination of reduced price efficiency and distortion in economic decisions
makes it desirable to reduce market power if this can be accomplished at low
cost.
It is essential to distinguish the exercise of market power near the
expiration of a futures contract from the effect of large trades that move
prices. That is, a hedger's or speculator's trading can cause prices to rise
or fall without being manipulative. To see why, consider the case of a large
speculator who purchases vast quantities of a commodity because he believes
it to be undervalued. Prices increase in response to this trading activity
because other traders recognize that the speculator may possess private
information on the true value of the commodity Thus, the price rises to
reflect this "bullish" private information.
The speculator's trading moves the market, but it is not in itself an
exercise of market power. Indeed, the speculator would prefer that his
trading not move the market. As long as the large trader does not stand for
deliveries with the purpose of raising the price during the delivery period,
his trading is not manipulative. Thus, the concept of market power should
not be equated with the ability to move prices. Instead, use of the term
should be restricted to those instances in which a trader uses the power
inherent in a large futures position to cause the price at contract expiration
to rise above what she believes to be its fundamental value. 16
The equation of manipulation and market power raises other issues.
Most importantly, this linkage immediately brings antitrust law to rmnd.
13. See S. Craig Pirrong, Mixed Manpulation Strategies in Commodity Futures Markets,
15 J. FuTURES MARKETS (forthcoming 1995).
14. See id.
15. See S. Craig Pirrong, Manipulation of the Commodity Futures Market Delivery
Process, 66 J. Bus. 335, 344-48 (1993).
16. At first blush, this test seems inherently subjective and thus impossible to prove in
practice. This conclusion is incorrect. A true manipulator's actions reveal that she indeed
believes that she caused the price to exceed fundamental value. For details of this argument,
see infra part V.B.3 (discussing method ofdiscerning speculative from manipulative motives).
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The definition and measurement of market power in that context has proven
illusive. Moreover, under antitrust law, the use of monopoly power to raise
prices is not illegal. This raises the following question: If the concept of
market power is well-nigh useless in antitrust analysis, why should it prove
any more illuminating in a futures market context?
There are two answers to this question. First, it is undeniable that a
comer or squeeze represents the exercise of market power. Thus, a failure
to connect the concept of market power to the statutory prohibitions against
comers is to ignore the essence of the offense. Put another way, the
incorporation into commodity law of the antitrust view that it is legal to
exercise market power in order to increase prices would represent a de facto
legalization of comers. This would render the antimampulation sections of
federal commodity statutes meaningless.7 Second, it is undeniably true
that the concept of monopoly power is nebulous in many markets. In these
cases, it is difficult, if not impossible, to define the relevant market and to
determine whether a firm or individual artificially reduced output or raised
price. Fortunately, this is not the case in futures markets because the
relevant market is very well defined as the market at the delivery point
during the delivery period. Moreover, because economic theory clearly
demonstrates the effects of a long futures market manipulation on prices and
quantities, it is possible to collect and observe the relevant data to deternune
whether the predicted effects of the exercise of market power occurred in a
particular instance.
Specifically, if a trader exercises market power during the delivery
period:"
1. The futures price and the cash price at the delivery market are
abnormally high relative to prices at other, nondeliverable
locations, prices of nondeliverable grades of the same commodity,
17 Section 9 of the CEA makes it a felony "to comer or attempt to comer any
commodity " 7 U.S.C. § 13(a)(2) (Supp. V 1993). Moreover, § 5 of the CEA requires
exchanges to prevent corners, id. § 7(4), § 8a(9) allows the CFTC to intervene in order to
prevent comers, id. § 12a(9) (1988 & Supp. V 1993), and § 5a requires exchanges to
establish delivery systems and delivery differentials in order to reduce the likelihood of a
corner, id. § 7(a)(10). Thus, it is apparent that the statute regards exercise of market
power-a corner-as an important form of market manipulation. In fact, a comer is the only
kind of manipulation that is listed by name. Moreover, the cases discussed in Part IV clearly
state that a comer is a form of market manipulation. See infra part IV.B.
18. See Pirrong, supra note 15, at 346-48 (deriving this theory).
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and prices of related commodities (e.g., in a corn manipulation,
the corn price should rise relative to the price of soybeans, which
is affected by similar weather and demand factors). Again, these
distortions may manifest themselves gradually, and they are largest
immediately prior to the time that the manipulator liquidates.
Moreover, at some time prior to contract expiration the futures and
deliverable spot prices rise abnormally, relative to prices of
comparable commodities.
2. Large shipments of the commodity flow to the delivery point
immediately prior to and during the delivery period. Moreover,
shipments from the delivery point are abnormally small during the
delivery period as traders amass stocks to make delivery
3. The price of the manipulated contract is abnormally high relative
to the price of the next expiring contracts (i.e., the price of the
"front month" contract is artificially high relative to the deferred
or "back month" contracts). This elevation should become evident
sometime prior to the end of trading and may become manifest
only gradually as traders become progressively more aware of the
possibility of a manipulation. The magnitude of the distortion is
largest immediately prior to the time that the mampulator liquidates
his position because then other traders are most fully aware of the
prospects for a squeeze. For a given value of the spot-futures
differential (adjusted for the costs of carrying inventory between
the current date and the expiration of the deferred futures con-
tract), there is an abnormally large amount of the deliverable
commodity in store in the delivery market. That is, the amount of
the commodity in store at the delivery market is significantly larger
than the so-called "supply of storage curve" implies. 9
4. The spot price in the delivery market declines precipitously both
absolutely and relative to deferred month futures prices and spot
prices at other locations around the end of futures trading or the
delivery period. (This is the "burying the body" effect.) The
19. See JEFFERY WILLIAMS, THE ECONOMIC FUNCTION OF FUTURES MARKETS 137-42
(1986) (analyzing supply of storage curve); JEFFERY C. WILLIAMS & BRIAN D. WRIGHT,
STORAGE AND COMMODITY MARKETS 248, 350-56 (1991) (same); Lester G. Telser, Futures
Trading and the Storage of Cotton and Wheat, 66 J. POL. ECON. 233,234-37 (1958) (same);
Holbrook Working, Theory of the Inverse Carrying Charge in Futures Markets, 30 J. FARM
ECON. 1, 17-26 (1948) (same). The supply of storage curve plots the spot-futures basis
adjusted for carrying costs against the amount of the deliverable commodity m store.
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timing of this decline may vary, depending upon when the
manipulator liquidates and the time required to move stocks to the
delivery point.
5. Delivery point receipts are abnormally small after the delivery
period because of the glut of the commodity that results from the
artificially large shipments. Shipments from the delivery point
increase after the end of a corner as some of the excess shipments
are returned to their original sources and delayed shipments are
released.
The intuition behind these results is straightforward. A manipulation
may be profitable when (1) the incremental cost of augmenting deliverable
supplies increases as shorts make more deliveries and (2) a trader owns
enough futures positions.2' Under these circumstances, a large long who
stands for an excessive number of deliveries drives up the costs that shorts
must incur to deliver even more of the commodity Shorts are willing to
pay the long a price equal to this artificially inflated cost of delivering
against another contract in order to settle the remainder of their positions.
Submitting to the long's "extortion" in this fashion allows shorts to avoid
incurring the high cost of delivering even more. Thus, by calling for too
many deliveries of the commodity (i.e., by liquidating too few contracts)
the large long induces shorts to repurchase their remaining positions at
artificially high prices. The large long profits when he sells contracts at
these high prices.
This description shows that a cornerer artificially increases demand for
the commodity at the delivery point during the delivery period in order to
earn a supercompetitive profit. This artificial demand stimulus explains the
five enumerated effects of manipulation. Because the demand increase is
confined to the delivery market, the price in that market rises relative to the
prices in other markets (Implication 1). Moreover, this relative price
20. Marginal costs of delivery are typically increasing for "spatial commodities" (i.e.,
commodities which are (1) produced and consumed over a wide geographical area and (2)
costly to transport). Examples of such goods include grains and industrial metals. The
marginal cost of delivery is increasing for such commodities because it is necessary to acquire
additional supplies from progressively less economical locations. Manipulation is not limited
to spatial commodities, however. Any transaction cost that makes it costly to increase
deliverable supply can facilitate manipulation. Thus, a comer may occur in a financial
market, although the conditions in financial markets are typically less conducive to
manipulation than the conditions in physical commodity markets.
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increase in the delivery market (1) attracts additional supplies to that point
and (2) induces some traders to hold stocks at the point at which they would
have shipped elsewhere but for the manipulation (Implication 2). Together
these actions inflate stock prices in the delivery market. The demand
increase is also confined to a narrow time interval-the delivery period.
This raises the price in the delivery market during the delivery period
relative to the prices for deferred delivery (Implication 3). This distortion
in temporal pricing patterns is even more evident when one controls for the
size of the stocks in the delivery market. In a competitive market, the spot
price is high relative to the deferred futures price only when deliverable
stocks are unusually small. Therefore, if the current spot price is high
relative to the deferred futures price at the same time that deliverable stocks
are very large, it is unlikely that all traders were acting competitively at
contract expiration. Finally, the cornerer abruptly terminates the artificial
demand stimulus at the end of the delivery period. This sudden decrease
in demand, combined with the artificial inflation in stock prices, causes the
spot price to plunge in the delivery market (Implication 4). The spot price
declines both absolutely and relative to (1) prices in other markets, (2) the
deferred futures price, and (3) the but-for-mampulation competitive spot
price.21 Market participants refer to this postdelivery price collapse as the
"burying the body (or corpse)" effect.' The decline in demand at the end
of the delivery period also leads to an increase in shipments from, and a
reduction in shipments to, the delivery market (Implication 5).
It is important to note that these price and quantity effects are quite
distinct from the price and quantity effects of other "unusual" events in
futures markets. 3 Most importantly, the effects of manipulation are
readily distinguishable from systemic demand or supply shocks.24 For
21. The postmanipulation spot price is below the no-manipulation spot prlce because the
comer increases supplies in the delivery market.
22. This phrase is attributed to the noted grain trader and meat magnate P.D. Armour.
When once asked whether it was easy to manipulate the market, Armour replied that the
manipulator faced the same problem as a murderer: "To commit murder is very simple, the
trouble is to bury the corpse." BOB TAMARKIN, THE MERc 83 (1993). That is, it is easy to
drive the price up by buying huge quantities, but hard to sell what one buys at a profit.
23. See Easterbrook, supra note 9, at S107 (arguing that price and quantity effects of
manipulation are distinctive).
24. A systemic shock is one that affects all markets in common in a similar fashion.
That is, a systemic shock is not concentrated in the delivery market alone.
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example, some argue that an export boom or a crop failure could produce
the same economic symptoms as a manipulation. It is indeed true that
shocks of this sort can lead to a large increase in prices and changes in
commodity flows, but the pattern of these price and quantity changes is
substantially different from those resulting from a manipulation.
Take, for instance, the case of an export boom in soybeans. During
the typical boom, demand increases at the major export points, including
the Gulf of Mexico, Toledo, the East Coast of the United States, as well as
Chicago, the primary delivery point for the CBOT soybean futures
contract. This increase in demand causes prices to vary at all of these
points and at the points tributary to them (e.g., the growing regions of
Iowa). Although prices rise at all locations, relative prices between the
various export ports should not change much because demand is rising at
all points. In particular, the relative price at the futures delivery point does
not necessarily rise during an export boom. Indeed, the price may fall.
During a squeeze, in contrast, demand increases only at the delivery point;
thus, the price in Chicago should rise significantly relative to the prices in
the other important soybean markets. In other words, during an export
boom, the relative price in Chicago would increase dramatically only if the
boom were confined to that point. Tus would be peculiar, to say the least.
Manipulation has other telltale signs that distinguish it from systemic
shocks. For example, the "burying the body" effect is unique to mampula-
tion. 5 Moreover, export booms do not lead to an unusual relationship
between stocks of the commodity and the spread between spot and futures
prices. Furthermore, during an export boom the number of shipments from
the delivery market should increase, whereas during a manipulation the
number of shipments from the delivery market should decline. Similar
arguments hold for other systemic shocks. In sum, therefore, one can
distinguish a large manipulation from other unusual events that affect
commodity prices and flows. Only a large surge in demand confined to the
delivery market during the delivery period can explain the price and
quantity effects of manipulation; absent a squeeze, such a demand shock is
highly unusual and, hence, should be readily identifiable.
25. The "burying the body" effect is unique to manipulation unless, of course, one was
willing to believe that the export boom collapsed on a single day that just happened to
correspond with the expiration of a futures contract.
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One should not interpret the foregoing to mean that unusual events
cannot make a manipulation more likely For example, a drought that
reduces supplies of a commodity can make a manipulation more profitable
and, hence, more likely It is inappropriate to conclude, however, that the
drought causes the corner. Traders must take positive actions to complete
a corner. These actions cause prices to deviate noticeably from those that
would prevail if there is a drought, but no squeeze.'
Econonic theory also describes how a manipulator behaves in order
to maximize her profits. I will argue below that these implications are
important because they allow a fact finder to determine whether a large
long acted with manipulative intent. Specifically-
1. The manipulator takes an abnormally large number of deliveries,
but also liquidates a substantial portion of her position.
2. The manipulator may sell large quantities of the commodity
immediately after the expiration of the cornered contract, but a
competitive trader would not.
The first implication holds true because the cornerer must take
delivery of a large quantity of the commodity in order to drive up the
marginal cost of delivery 27 These deliveries are "large" relative to (1) the
26. Some analysts have asserted the existence of a so-called "natural comer." See 7
U.S. FED. TRADE COMM'N, REPORT OF THE FEDERALTRADE COMMISSION ON THE GRAIN
TRADE: EFFECTs OF FUTURE TRADING 243-44 (1926) (asserting existence of natural
comers). A natural comer is said to occur when some exogenous development reduces
supplies of a commodity and allows a trader with a relatively small position to exercise
market power. Some claim that the trader who does so is blameless because he simply took
advantage of the prevailing conditions; several judicial and regulatory decisions discussed
below adopt this view See infra part IV.B.3. I argue below that this is a very dangerous
proposition because it gives large traders a "manipulation option." See infra part V.B.3.
27 One subtle point deserves mention in this context. Many commercial futures
traders engage in so-called "exchange for physical" (EFP) transactions. In anEFP, a trader
of short futures makes the following arrangement with a trader of long futures: The short
delivers the commodity to the long and buys a futures contract from the long. This
transaction is essentially equivalent to the short simply delivering the commodity to the long
because the two traders' futures positions cancel, and the short tenders the good to the long.
The only important difference between a delivery and an EFP is that in the latter, the
parties can choose to make or take delivery outside the delivery market, before the delivery
period, or both. In the context of a manipulation, an EFP is not a substitute for a delivery,
as the long must agree to the transaction. Thus, shorts cannot unilaterally use EFPs to
escape a comer.
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amount of deliveries that normally occur m the market and (2) the number
of deliveries taken by other traders during a mampulation. The second
implication is true because competitive traders would rather liquidate their
futures positions at the artificially high price than take delivery of a good
that they know will iimmnently decline m value. In other words, the
manipulator bears the burden of burying the body, and she must take the
lion's share (perhaps all) of the deliveries. Although she takes substantial
deliveries, the manipulator must sell some futures contracts prior to
expiration in order to earn a profit. Because of the burying the body effect,
if she took delivery on the entire position, she would actually incur a loss
when reselling the goods delivered to her.
These implications distinguish a manipulator's conduct from a
competitive trader's actions. A trader that takes delivery because he actually
wants the commodity (rather than to corner the market) would not simulta-
neously sell futures contracts. Moreover, a cornerer knows that the price of
the commodity will decline at the end of the delivery period, but the cornerer
nevertheless takes deliveries because she knows that she must do so mn order
to inflate the price at which she sells futures contracts. Once the mampulat-
ed contract expires, she has no use for what was delivered to her, so she is
likely to sell. The sale of the commodity in the face of a price decline upon
contract expiration is not consistent, however, with competitive motivations.
In the absence of new information about the value of the commodity, a
competitive trader who takes a large number of deliveries for legitimate
reasons (e.g., to fill an export order) would want to buy more of the
commodity if the price were to decline precipitously immediately after he
had just taken delivery of the good at the expiration of a futures contract.
In conclusion, market power manipulation has distinctive effects on
price and quantity relations. In the sections that follow, I use the criteria
identified by this economic analysis of manipulation to (1) analyze the
manipulation case law and (2) construct an antimampulation doctrine that
addresses the shortcomings of the existing doctrine implicit m these cases.
IV An Analysis of Manipulation Law and Commentary
A. An Overview
There is a substantial, though not overwhelming, body of case law on
mampulation. This case law derives from various authorities, including the
federal and state courts in criminal and private suits and AIJs and
commissioners of federal regulatory agencies including (in chronological
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order of establishment) the Grain Futures Administration, the Commodity
Exchange Authority, and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(CFTC). Unfortunately, these examples of ex post adjudication of
manipulation have "become an embarrassment-confusing, contradictory,
complex, and unsophisticated."28 In particular, the current precedents
make it extremely difficult to find a trader guilty of manipulation even in
cases in which the economic analysis suggests that the trader has indeed
manipulated. Given this state of affairs, ex post deterrence is currently a
weak bulwark against future manipulations. This raises the question of
whether it is possible to construct a set of legal rules applicable expost that
would provide a superior deterrence mechanism.
The remainder of this Part documents the failings of the received law
and constructs an economically and legally defensible set of alternative
legal criteria. Subpart IV.B uses the economic analysis of the previous Part
as a benchmark by which to examine this law critically Subpart IV.C
analyzes some alternative tests for manipulation that have been advanced
in the legal literature.
B. The Existing Law on Manipulation
The existing law on manipulation derives from a relative handful of
federal judicial and regulatory agency decisions. The landmark court cases
include Great Western Food Distributors, Inc. v Brannan,29 Cargill, Inc.
v Hardin,3" and Volkart Bros. v Freeman.31  Important regulatory
decisions include Hohenberg Bros.,32 Indiana Farm Bureau Cooperative
Ass'n,33 Cox,34 and Abrams.35
28. Edward T. McDermott, Defining Manipulation in Commodity Futures Trading:
The Futures "Squeeze, "74 Nw. U. L. REV 202, 205 (1979).
29. 201 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1953).
30. 452 F.2d 1154 (8th Cir. 1971).
31. 311 F.2d 52 (5th Cir. 1962).
32. [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,271 (Feb. 18, 1977).
33. [1982-1984 TransferBinder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 21,796 (Dec. 17, 1982).
34. [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 23,786 (July 15, 1987).
35. [1987-1990 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 24,408 (Feb. 8, 1989).
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These cases have defined a basic three-part test for determining whether
a manipulation has occurred.36 Specifically, to prove that a trader manipu-
lated the market at a particular time, it is necessary to demonstrate that
(1) an artificial price existed at that time; (2) the accused trader caused the
artificial price; and (3) the accused trader intended to cause the artificial
price. This set of conditions is eminently defensible. Unfortunately, the
burden of proof that has evolved for each condition is not. I discuss each
condition in turn.
1 Pnce Artificiality
The analysis in Part III clearly demonstrates that manipulation has
pronounced effects on prices. Specifically, manipulation elevates the
futures price and the price of the deliverable commodity both absolutely and
relative to the prices for other grades, locations, and delivery dates. Thus,
price artificiality is the sine qua non of manipulation.
By making price artificiality a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition
for a finding of manipulation, the courts have recognized the central
importance of prices in determining whether a corner or squeeze occurred.
Unfortunately, however, the relevant decisions have not established firm or
defensible criteria for determning whether a particular price is or is not
artificial. Indeed, recent decisions may have the effect of excluding the
evidence most valuable for establishing price distortion. Specifically, these
cases (and some scholarly commentary) discount the use of historical price
comparisons as a means of determining price artificiality
Cargill, Inc. v Hardin37 and Great Western Food Distributors, Inc. v
Brannan38 both illustrate the use of historical price comparisons. Cargill
involved the actions of a large grain merchant during the liquidation of the
May 1963 wheat future traded on the CBOT 19 Cargill owned all of the
deliverable supply of wheat and, in the days leading up to contract expira-
tion, purchased a speculative long futures position.' Fifteen minutes
36. See 3 PHILIP M. JOHNSON & THOMAS L. HAZEN, COMMODITIES REGULATION
§§ 5.13-5.27, at 32-54 (2d ed. 1989) (discussing price artificiality, causation, and intent as
they relate to manipulation).
37 452 F.2d 1154 (8th Cir. 1971).
38. 201 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1953).
39 See Cargill, Inc. v Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1158-59 (8th Cir. 1971).
40. See td. at 1159.
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before the close of trading on the contract's expiration date, Cargill entered
limit orders to sell contracts at a price of $2.29 per bushel, $0.14 per bushel
higher than the price prevailing only forty minutes earlier. 41 In finding the
firm guilty of manipulation, the court relied upon four types of price
evidence: (1) The price rise m the last hour of trading was larger than any
observed in the prior nine years; (2) The May-July spread change was larger
than any observed in the prior nine years; (3) The spread between Chicago
and Kansas City wheat was far larger than had been observed previously;
and (4) the futures price at the closing of trade exceeded the price other
traders were bidding for wheat in the Chicago cash market by a very large
margin.42
In Great Western, the court conducted a similar analysis of the
defendant's conduct in the December 1947 refrigerated egg contract traded
on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. 43 The court found that the egg
futures price at the close of trading was abnormally high (relative to past
values) when compared to the January 1948 egg futures price.4 Moreover,
even though refrigerated eggs typically sold at a discount to fresh eggs,
during the period of interest the opposite was true.45
According to the analysis in Part I, the reasoning m both cases is
solid. The courts relied upon the appropriate relative prices. The only
ground for criticism is that the courts did not establish a standard for
determining how large a deviation from typical price relations is sufficient
for a finding of artificiality Prices can deviate from historical relations for
reasons unrelated to manipulation. For example, the Chicago-Kansas City
spread varies with local supply, demand, and transport conditions. It would
have been desirable, therefore, for the court to have examined explicitly the
variability of past price relations (e.g., by adjusting the Chicago-Kansas City
spread by its mean and standard deviation). If the observed deviations from
the mean were far larger than those likely to appear by chance given the
observed past variability, the court could have established artificiality more
authoritatively
41. See id. at 1160.
42. Id. at 1167-70.
43. See Great W Food Distribs., Inc. v Brannan, 201 F.2d 476, 478, 482-84 (7th Cir
1953).
44. Id. at 483.
45. Id.
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The failure to adjust the deviations from normal price relations for their
observed variability opened the door for later decisions to ignore historical
price data altogether. Specifically, the decisions of the CFTC commission-
ers m Indiana Farm Bureau and Cox discounted extremely strong evidence
of price distortions resulting from (1) the behavior of the Indiana Farm
Bureau (Bureau) on the last trading day of the July 1973 CBOT corn contract
and (2) the actions of brokers Cox and Frey on the last trading day of the
May 1971 CBOT wheat contract. In both cases, on the basis of historical
price comparisons similar to those employed in Cargill and Great Western,
the ALJs found strong evidence of price distortions. 46 The distortion in
Indiana Farm Bureau was particularly extreme: the price of corn rose 30 %
on the last trading day, an unprecedented rise m such a short period of
time.47 Relative prices were similarly out of line with previous experience.
Although not as spectacular as those observed m July 1973 corn, the price
distortions in May 1971 wheat were pronounced nonetheless. As in Cargill,
the closing futures price was high (when compared to historical levels) in
comparison to prices in other markets, prices of deferred contracts, and
contemporaneous and deferred cash prices in Chicago.48
In later hearings, however, this kind of evidence did not persuade the
commissioners of the CFTC. Although Commissioners Johnson and Stone
found prices artificial m Indiana Farm Bureau,49 a majority of the commis-
sioners did not.5" Indeed, the majority decision asserted that cash-futures
price comparisons were useless. 51 The commissioners argued that instead
of examlmng prices alone, "one must look at the aggregate forces of supply
and demand and search for those factors which are extraneous to the pricing
system." 2 The outcome in Cox was similar. In the majority opinion, the
46. Cox, [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 21,267, at27,092-
101 (Jan. 3, 1983); Indiana Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n, [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] Comm.
Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 21,796, at 27,280-81 (Dec. 17, 1982).
47 Indiana Farm Bureau, [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH)
21,796, at 27,280-81.
48. Cox, [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 21,267, at 27,072,
27,093; see Cargill, Inc. v Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1167-70 (8th Cir. 1971).
49. Indiana Farm Bureau, [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH)
21,796, at 27,290, 27,301.
50. Id. at 27,287
51. Id. at 27,286-87
52. Id. at 27,288 n.2.
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commissioners concluded that "the prospective behavior of a 'normal'
market is not necessarily bounded by the market's historical experiences."53
In sum, the CFTC explicitly rejected the use of historical price comparisons
and suggested that a complete analysis of overall supply and demand
conditions was necessary to find price artificiality
Some academic commentators have concurred with this reasoning.54
The academic commentators argue that an anomalous price relation is not a
sufficient condition for a finding of price artificiality because it is possible
that such a relation could arise in the absence of manipulation due to the
occurrence of unprecedented supply, demand, or transport considerations.
In essence, these critics assert that because historical data cannot prove with
metaphysical certainty that the price observed in a particular instance was not
the result of unusual conditions mn a competitive market, a court cannot use
these data to determine whether this price was in fact the result of noncom-
petitive conduct by some trader. Although it is certainly logically correct
that divine revelation is more certain than historical comparisons, this is
untenable as a principle of jurisprudence. One can never be absolutely
certain of any "fact", any decision based on any evidence involves some
probability of error. The relevant questions are: (1) How likely is a
particular inference to be wrong, and (2) what level of confidence is required
to establish guilt? If the answer to the latter question is 100%, a judicial
system is superfluous because certainty is impossible. Conversely, if a more
practical standard (e.g., 95%) is adopted, historical data analysis is
extraordinarily useful.
Fortunately, statistical analysis of historical data allows a very precise
answer to the first question. Given the variability observed in historical
price relations (spreads of various sorts, changes in a single price, or
changes in spreads), one can calculate measures of variability such as the
standard deviation. Now consider a price relation that allegedly results from
manipulative conduct. Given some assumptions about the probability
53. Cox, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 23,786, at 34,064
(July 15, 1987).
54. See JOHNSON& HAZEN, supra note 36, § 5.18, at39; Robert C. Lower, Disruptions
of the Futures Market: A Comment on Dealing with Market Manipulation, 8 YALE J. ON REG.
391,394-96 (1991); McDermott, supra note 28, at 211-12; Wendy C. Perdue, Manipulation
ofFutures Markets:Redefining the Offense, 56 FORDHAM L. REv 345, 373-80 (1987). See
generally M. Van Smith, Preventing the Manipulation of Commodity Futures Markets: To
Deliver or Not to Deliver?, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 1569 (1981).
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distribution of the price relation, under the null (maintained) hypotheses that
(1) the market was in fact competitive and (2) the structural conditions
prevailing at the time of the manipulation were in the universe of possibili-
ties that generated the historical data set, one can calculate the probability
that the observed relation was actually consistent with competitive behavior
by the accused and merely resulted from a chance combination of exogenous
conditions. Thus, one can calculate exactly the likelihood of a wrongful
conviction. To the extent that these various relative prices are independent,
this probability may be extremely small.
Some still object to the use of historical data for a variety of reasons.
Wendy Perdue claims that the historical prices may themselves be artificial,
that cash prices are unreliable, and that the artificial price test is too vague,
complex, and rigid.55 She also asserts that price standards cannot detect
attempted but failed manipulations and that standards may provide a legal
justification for regulators to intervene to prevent unusual price move-
ments." Edward McDermott claims that any use of historical data assumes
constant supply and demand conditions and that "a test of manipulation based
ultimately on price comparison has very limited utility "" These statements
echo clais made in Indiana Farm Bureau and Cox. In addition, Robert
Lower clans that "[b]ecause futures contracts are artificial in the sense that
they are stylized and divorced from the actual commodities to which they
relate, the concept of price artificiality as a measure of mampulation is
elusive and, possibly, illusory "8 Daniel Fischel and David Ross argue that
unusual supply and demand conditions create unusual prices and, therefore,
that it is difficult to distinguish noncompetitive prices from competitive
prices resulting from unusual scarcity 59
Fortunately, none of these objections is fatal nor even particularly
damaging. If historical prices are themselves artificial, it is indeed true that
given a standard of proof, more, but not all, manipulators may escape
conviction than if the historical data set is unblemished; the accused are the
beneficiaries of past artificialities. Note, however, that if these artificialities
may themselves be identified, they can be excluded from comparisons. This
55. See Perdue, supra note 54, at 365-67
56. See id. at 373-80.
57 McDermott, supra note 28, at 211-12.
58. Lower, supra note 54, at 394.
59 See Fischel & Ross, supra note 9, at 546.
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costs degrees of freedom, and therefore statistical precision, but allows more
exact comparisons. In any event, only borderline cases are affected.
Extreme distortions (as sometimes occur) still stand out. In other words,
someone found guilty of manipulation on the basis of historical comparisons
cannot claim that past artificialities in the data led to a wrongful verdict; only
a disappointed plaintiff or prosecutor can do so. Although it is most
beneficial to deter the most egregious offenses, reduced precision in
marginal ones is no reason to discard historical price analysis altogether.'
Nor are unreliable cash price data an insuperable obstacle. Like past
artificialities, measurement errors simply add noise to the historical data;
they are less precise as a result. As before, the lower precision favors the
accused, but mainly in borderline cases. Moreover, as a practical matter,
cash price data, though much maligned, are frequently quite precise. For
example, my analysis (in conjunction with Roger Kormendi and David
Haddock) of grain futures markets in the 1980s demonstrates that grain cash
bids (which are belittled by some industry participants) actually perform
quite well when evaluated by objective standards.6"
With respect to vagueness, complexity, and rigidity, it should be noted
that these tests are anything but vague; there is a huge amount of literature
describing the proper way to execute these tests. Moreover, courts have
shown an ability to interpret statistical evidence in securities fraud, merger,
antitrust, and affirmative action cases. Because the tests proposed here are
typically more straightforward and more readily motivated and explained
than those employed in these other settings, it is clear that they are not
beyond the capacity of a court to utilize. Nor is rigidity a problem unless
artificial rules are established limiting the use of the tests.
The alleged inability to detect failed manipulations is not especially
damaging either. First, there are numerous historical examples of severe
price distortions prior to and contemporaneous with the collapse of
mampulations.62 Second, if an attempted manipulation has no pronounced
60. See generally Note, The Delivery Requirement: An Illusory Bar to Regulation of
Manipulation in Commodity Exchanges, 73 YALE L.J. 171 (1963) (making similar argument).
"While some miscreants may inevitably escape under the cover of ambiguity, this is not a
sound reason for refusing to punish those who cannot." Id. at 184.
61. S. CRAIG PIRRONG ET AL., GRAIN FtJTURES CONTRACTS: AN ECONOMICAPPRAISAL
9-50, 107-38 (1993).
62. See generally WILLIAM G. FERRIS, THE GRAIN TRADERS (1988); 1 HISTORY OF THE
BOARD OF TRADE OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO (Charles H. Taylor ed., 1917); 2 id. As an
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price effects, then the manipulation is not particularly costly and, therefore,
not worth the expense of prosecution. In other words, it is wasteful to
prosecute those who act with malicious intent but who inflict no harm.
Given past criticisms of futures markets, the elastic use of the word
"manmpulation," and the frequent overreaching of self-appointed guardians
of market integrity, one can imagine that some overly aggressive regulator
could use a statistical test to declare certain large price shocks resulting from
large fundamental changes as the product of mampulation to justify an
intervention into the price determination process. However, because the
existing manipulation standard also requires findings of causation and intent,
it is unlikely that a price change alone is sufficient cover for such an action.
Moreover, one should not discard a useful tool because it may be misused.
Finally, manipulation causes large changes in relative prices, while most
fundamentally driven price shocks (e.g., weather announcements during the
1988 drought) do not alter relative prices drastically Therefore, if applied
correctly by focusing on relative price changes, a price artificiality test for
manipulation is a legitimate tool and is unlikely to be vulnerable to
opportunistic exploitation.
It is patently false to claim that statistical comparisons assume constant
supply and demand conditions. In fact, the proposed statistical tests
recogmze, and explicitly correct for, fundamental variability In reality, the
key assumption underlying the analysis is that the conditions prevailing at the
time of the alleged manipulation were within the bounds of the experience
that generated the observed data set. Larger data sets can therefore reduce
the severity of this problem. Moreover, truly remarkable conditions should
be readily identified. It is unlikely that an event that would cause an extreme
price change would go unnoticed; if no one noticed the umque shock, how
could it cause the price change? Finally, because manipulation distorts
relative prices, any condition (other than manipulation) that causes an
observed price change must occur in a fairly circumscribed market-the
delivery market. Again, it is unlikely that any event that would cause such
a noticeable distortion in such a narrow region would pass unobserved.
This discussion relates to the CFTC's assertion in Indiana Farm Bureau
that it is necessary to examine "aggregate forces of supply and demand" in
example, the collapse of the Leiter corner in 1898 resulted in a nearly 39% price decline in
a period of minutes. See id. at 967-69 The collapse of the gold corner during "Black
Friday" in 1869 resulted in an equally calamitous price shock. See KENNETH D. ACKERMAN,
THE GOLD RING 189-91 (1988).
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order to detenimne whether a price is artificial.63 This is an invitation to
obfuscation. In particular, it ignores the main virtue of prices-their ability
to summarize immense quantities of information dispersed among millions
of individuals, information that would be impossible for any individual or
group to collect, organize, or articulate coherently I The alternative is to
rely upon ad hoc theorizing and incomplete information. Moreover,
discarding the explicit use of historical price data does not eliminate the need
to rely upon some set of historical facts. Any analysis of "aggregate forces
of supply and demand" presumes some underlying model of how these
forces interact to determine price. Such a model is almost certainly based
on some basic theory calibrated to some set of historical observations.
Unfortunately, these historical observations are almost certainly imperfectly
remembered and haphazardly interpreted and, therefore, vulnerable to
criticism of subjectivity and incompleteness by the accused manipulator. It
is also clear that these judgments are still at least implicitly based upon
historical data, but such data are not rigorously tested. Furthermore, such
a standard provides the perfect opportunity for the accused to construct an
elaborate theory and provide superfluous and misleading evidence with no
purpose other than to sow confusion. As a result, an expansive review of
more basic supply and demand factors should at most supplement, and not
supplant, a rigorous analysis of price data.
The criticism that futures prices are inherently artificial is also far
off-base. Futures prices are not, as Lower claims, "divorced from the actual
supply and demand" situation specific to any time and place.' In fact, the
delivery requirement ensures that futures prices are determined by the
anticipated supply and demand situation at a very specific place and a very
specific time-the delivery point during the delivery period.
Finally, the analysis in Part III demonstrates clearly that the exercise of
market power has far different effects on prices than "unusual," but
competitive, supply and demand conditions. In particular, the burying the
body effect is unique to a corner.
In sum, although some seminal court cases have relied upon historical
data of price artificiality to determine whether a corner or squeeze in fact
63. Indiana Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n, [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L.
Rep. (CCII) 21,796, at 27,288 n.2 (Dec. 17, 1982).
64. See THOMAS SOWELL, KNOWLEDGE AND DECISIONS 78-80 (1980); F.A. Hayek, The
Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REv 519, 524-29 (1945).
65. See Lower, supra note 54, at 393-94.
51 WASH. & LEE L. REV 945 (1994)
occurred, recent regulatory decisions and scholarly analysis discount the
validity of historical price comparisons. This skepticism is entirely
unwarranted and undermines one of the prinary methods of detecting and
proving manipulation. As the discussion here suggests, historical price data
can provide a highly reliable (although not infallible) way to establish that
someone has exerted market power. Indeed, it is difficult to see how one
could prosecute manipulators without some reliance on price data. As one
comnmissioner noted in his dissent m Cox, the interpretation of historical data
implicit in recent manipulation cases suggests that ex post adjudicators
cannot rely on any data in manipulation cases. 6 If this is true, there is a
very high probability that anyone attempting a manipulation could escape
punishment, for the main evidence of his conduct would be madmissible.
This is one reason why manipulation is not prosecutable under current law
Unfortunately, it is not the only reason. As the following sections show, the
prevailing interpretations of causation and intent also benefit would-be
cornerers.
2. Causation
Assuming that a price artificiality has been proved, courts and
regulatory agencies have established that a finding of manipulation against
a particular trader requires a demonstration that the trader had the power to
cause the artificiality Demonstration of this power to cause price changes
is analogous to the demonstration of market power in an antitrust case. 67
Parallel to the structure of an antitrust case, the demonstration of causation
m manipulation cases has proceeded in two steps: (1) definition of the
relevant market and (2) presentation of evidence that the accused mampula-
tor had the ability to affect price in the market as defined. Although
theoretically appropriate in certain circumstances, in practice, this two-step
test has produced some extraordinarily convoluted reasoning and has created
some dangerous precedents.
The analysis in Part III suggests that a trader can exert market power
by holding claims granting ownership to the deliverable grade in the delivery
market in excess of the quantity in store there at contract expiration. These
66. Cox, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCII) 23,786, at 34,076
(July 15, 1987) (Comm'r West, dissenting).
67 Richard D. Friedman, Stalking the Squeeze: Understanding Commodities Market
Manipulation, 89 MICH. L. REv 30, 44-46 (1990) (comparing demonstration of ability to
cause price changes to demonstration of market power in antitrust cases).
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clais can consist of either long futures positions or direct ownership of the
physical commodity In all of the relevant cases the courts and comrmssions
have used some variant on this criterion to deternmne whether traders possess
market power. Unfortunately, they have too often stumbled in the seemingly
straightforward task of defimng the deliverable stock.
The two most damaging cases are Indiana Farm Bureau and Cox. In
the former, a total of 4.6 million bushels of corn were in store in Chicago
(the delivery point), while the Bureau's position was only 2.5 million
bushels.68 At first blush, it appears that the Bureau's position was too
small to confer market power. However, inquiries revealed that the vast
bulk of the stocks m Chicago were committed to firm export sales.69
According to CFTC Division of Enforcement investigations, only 511,000
bushels of free stocks of corn were readily accessible for delivery; 4.1
million bushels were committed to firm export sales.7"
This disparity resulted in considerable confusion. The AUJ and the
CFTC commissioners both declared the deliverable supply to be 4.6 million
bushels and, therefore, doubted whether any actions by the Bureau could
have inflated prices artificially 11 The ALJ and the CFTC commissioners
discounted the importance of committed stocks.
This interpretation is subject to dispute. The model in Part M did not
explicitly address the issue of commitment, but it can be modified to do so
in order to reveal the defect in the reasoning in Indiana Farm Bureau.
Specifically, delivering committed stocks may impose transactions costs on
the short. Moreover, the model in Part IlI implicitly assumed that the large
long sold the commodity delivered to him mn a competitive market immedi-
ately after the delivery period. If this assumption changes, and the long
instead acts as a postdelivery monopolist, commitment of stocks may become
a very important factor.
A grain merchandising firm that has committed to supply a customer
with a given quantity of grain at a given time may incur severe costs if it is
unable to fulfill this contractual obligation. There may be explicit penalties
for default. The firm may also be forced to pay demurrage on ship or rail
68. In re Indiana Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n, [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut.
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transport committed to move the stocks. More importantly, a firm that earns
a reputation for poor contractual performance is likely to operate at a
disadvantage in this extremely competitive business. In order to avoid
defaulting, a firm may have to make costly logistical adjustments in order to
accommodate the disruptions that occur when it delivers committed stocks
against futures.
These factors influence the willingness of merchants to supply stocks
committed to fulfill obligations to shorts for delivery during a potential
manipulation; thus, they affect the marginal cost of delivery The transac-
tion costs of making delivery arising from a default on an export commit-
ment or logistical adjustment are a form of economic friction that can make
market power manipulation profitable.
Moreover, owners of committed stocks in the delivery market realize
that if control of these stocks falls into the hands of a single party, they are
faced with several unpalatable options. They may (1) fail to meet their
contractual obligations and bear the explicit penalties and the costs arising
from reputational loss; (2) attempt to acquire replacement stocks outside the
delivery market and transport them to an export point; or (3) repurchase the
stocks from the trader who took delivery
If the trader who took delivery can act as a monopolist instead of a
competitor, the trader can charge the merchants a high price for the stocks.
This is true because the first two options are very costly Moreover, it is
quite likely that the manipulator can indeed act as a monopolist in the spot
market because the source of his market power is the ability to price discrim-
inate intertemporally The manipulator can intertemporally price discrimi-
nate because the necessity of timely delivery on export commitments makes
the merchants more willing to pay more for immediate return of the stocks
than for their return at some time in even the near future. Current owners
of the stocks-the grain merchants with export commitments-recognize that
if they sell their stocks to shorts to permit them to satisfy delivery obliga-
tions, then they are likely to pay a monopoly price to reacquire them. As a
result, they are willing to sell their stocks only at the high, monopoly price.
This analysis implies that it is inappropriate to ignore commitment of stocks.
A similar issue arose in Cox, in which there was a dispute over the
willingness of millers to make their stock of wheat available to shorts.'
Another question of delivery stock definition also caused contention in that
72. Cox, [1986-1987 TransferBinder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 23,786, at 34,059-
60 (July 15, 1987).
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case. Specifically, the accused mampulator argued that stocks of wheat
outside the delivery point (Chicago) should be included when calculating the
deliverable supply; these stocks included wheat owned by the principal short,
Cook Industries (Cook), contained in barges on the Missouri River near
Kansas City '3 Cook intended to sell this wheat for export at New Or-
leans.' The commissioners accepted this broad definition of deliverable
supply and calculated that twenty-six million bushels of wheat were available
for delivery I The fact that this supply was larger than the position owned
by the alleged manipulators implied that they could not have caused any
artificial price movement.
The argument supporting this position defies logic. For example, the
commissioners argued that shipment of the wheat in Kansas City to Chicago
was economic because Cook intended to ship it to New Orleans, and New
Orleans is farther (as the barge floats) from Kansas City than Chicago is. 76
This statement is consistent with the physical geography of the case, but
ignores the relevant economic geography Of course, it was physically
possible to ship the grain to Chicago; the appropriate question is, however,
whether this was an economic transaction. If it was not, the short would
have rationally paid a noncompetitive price to liquidate his futures positions
in Chicago rather than deliver his Kansas City wheat.
The economics of manipulation demonstrate that the necessity of
distorting the direction and timing of commodity flows in order to enhance
delivery market stocks is just what allows the manipulator to inflate
prices.' It is clear that the diversion of the Kansas City wheat to Chicago
would have caused such a distortion; if Chicago was the most valuable
destination for Kansas City wheat, why did Cook plan to ship it to New
Orleans instead? The reasoning in Cox-namely, that the physical ability to
move stocks into deliverable position makes them part of the deliverable
73. Id. at 34,062.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 34,063.
76. Id.
77 See Pirrong, supra note 15, at 339-55. The decision in Cox is also contrary to a
stated objective of the CEA. As a part of the CEA's clear antimanipulation intent, § 5a
requires exchanges to choose delivery points and delivery differentials in order to prevent the
disruption of commodity flows. 7 U.S.C. § 7a(10) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Cox, in
contrast, encourages such distortions.
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supplyTS-makes it virtually impossible to prove causation because the
quantity of stocks that-could be moved to the delivery market is quite large.
Because many of the stocks that could be moved should not be shipped there,
however, it is clear that situations will arise in which a large trader
effectively exploits market power but can plausibly claim that the precedent
of Cox implies that he is blameless. The Cox decision, therefore, is a strong
card that a manipulator can play in his defense.
There are other problems with Indiana Farm Bureau and Cox. Most
importantly, they beg the following question: If deliverable supplies were
indeed so large, why (in the absence of any new fundamental information)
did shorts bid up the price so dramatically9 This is most clearly evident in
Indiana Farm Bureau because the price rise was so large79 and because in
Cox there was some dispute concerning whether shorts would have had the
time to deliver the supplies in Kansas City and elsewhere.'
Recall that in Indiana Farm Bureau, there was considerable disagree-
ment concerning the size of the deliverable stock of corn; estimates varied
from about 500,000 bushels to over four million bushels." If the latter
estimate was correct, shorts would have been able to acquire more than
enough corn to cover their outstanding futures commitments at prices far
lower than the $3.90 per bushel that they willingly paid to liquidate their
futures positions. Thus, if one presumes that shorts were rational and acting
in their own self interest, the decision in Indiana Farm Bureau cannot
adequately explain how the price change resulted, and the commissioners
advanced no other plausible explanation for it. In other words, the price
data strongly suggest that deliverable supplies were far smaller than four
million bushels, but an expansive definition of the deliverable stock
essentially removes the fact of the price change from the debate. This
conflict is especially apparent in the concurring opinion of Commissioner
78. Cox, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 23,786, at 34,062-
63.
79. Indiana Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n, [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L.
Rep. (CCH) 21,796, at 27,307-08 (Dec. 17, 1982).
80. Cox, [1986-1987 TransferBinder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 23,786, at 34,062-
63. The dispute in Cox over whether shorts would have had the time to deliver the supplies
raises questions concerning the culpability of shorts in failing to prepare to make deliveries,
which I discuss later.
81. Indiana Farm Bureau, [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCII)
21,796, at 27,287
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Johnson, who found the price artificial, but claimed that the Bureau had no
power to affect the price because deliverable supply was so large.'
Because Commissioner Johnson advanced no other cause of the artificial
price, it is impossible to reconcile these competing claims.
Other decisions (including Cargill and Great Western) do not include
such egregious errors, but rely upon similar reasomng. That is, they
compare some estimate of deliverable stock with the size of the accused's
position to determine whether he had market power. In each case, the fact
finders used a priori considerations to include or exclude certain stocks from
the deliverable supply In Cargill, for instance, the court excluded hard
wheat;' in Great Western, the court excluded fresh eggs.' In each case,
the court decided these alternative sources were excessively expensive.'
Although these decisions are more defensible than those made in
Indiana Farm Bureau or Cox (because the findings in Cargill and Great
Western are consistent with the observed price pattern), they are still
fundamentally ad hoc and leave open the possibility of future errors. Unlike
Volkart, Indiana Farm Bureau, Cox, and Abrams, Cargill and Great Western
explicitly recogmze that the costs of obtaining supplies for delivery are
relevant. Because the courts and commissions are ill-equipped to determine
these costs, however, it is by no means clear that they will be able to
evaluate accurately an accused manipulator's market power. The courts and
commissions will be unable to assess adequately the accused's ability to
"cause" an artificial price. Indeed, the market price at contract expiration
implies a lower bound on these costs and provides the most reliable estimate
of them. Thus, the deliverable supply test essentially collapses into a price
artificiality test.'
82. 1d. at 27,290 (Comm'r Johnson, concurring).
83. See Cargill, Inc. v Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1165-66 (8th Cir. 1971).
84. See Great W Food Distribs., Inc. v Brannan, 201 F.2d 476, 480-81 (7th Cir.
1953).
85. See Cargill, 452 F.2d at 1165-66; Great Western, 201 F.2d at 481.
86. Evidence from Indiana Farm Bureau provides further illustration of this fact.
Specifically, the delivery stock estimates provided by the CFTC's Division of Enforcement
conflict with the facts of the case. The Commission's staff estimated that deliverable stocks
were only about 500,000 bushels, but the Farm Bureau took delivery of over two million
bushels. Indiana Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n, [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L.
Rep. (CCH) 21,786, at 27,280 (Dec. 17, 1982). This again illustrates that delivery stock
estimates may be arbitrary when issues like commitment and the ability to bring new supplies
51 WASH. & LEE L. REV 945 (1994)
In many respects, the analysis of deliverable supplies resembles the
vacuous debates over market definition that occur in antitrust cases. In
antitrust cases, the existence of a variety of substitutes in consumption and
production makes it impossible to demarcate firm divisions between different
markets. As a result, accused manipulators attempt to define the market as
broadly as possible, and the accusers attempt to define it as narrowly as
possible. Similarly, in manipulation cases, issues of commitment and
economic geography make it difficult to establish definitively what the
deliverable stock is and, therefore, what the relevant marginal cost of
delivery is. If manipulation cases turn on definitions of deliverable supplies,
they may simply decay into struggles to draw firm boundaries where none
naturally exist. Establishing the quantity of a commodity available at the
competitive price requires information on the value of the alternative uses of
the various stocks. This information is held by many individuals and may
be extremely difficult to articulate. The history of antitrust analysis suggests
that, given the vagaries inherent in such a situation, confusing debates and
incoherent outcomes are inevitable." In other words, deliverable supply
estimates provide little information not already contained in prices, and
making a manipulation conviction turn on inevitably artificial estimates of
supplies invites confusion and contradiction. Indiana Farm Bureau and Cox
are two examples of how this can happen in manipulation cases.
There are other problems with the accepted view on causation. Most
importantly, the precedents set by Volkart, Indiana Farm Bureau, and Cox
may allow a long manipulator to escape unscathed by arguing that the shorts,
rather than a large long, "caused" the artificial price. For example, the
Volkart court found that there was substantial uncertificated cotton (i.e.,
cotton not regular for delivery) that the shorts could have made deliverable
through some effort, but did not: "Unless the shorts are to be excused from
the performance of their contracts and from the exercise of due diligence to
that end, the ample supply of uncertificated cotton must be considered as
to the market are relevant. Under these circumstances, the amount that will be delivered
is an increasing function of price. That is, there is no single number that gives "the"
deliverable stock. Price changes around contract expiration are the most reliable estimates
of the marginal cost of delivering the commodity Thus, a priori estimates of deliverable
stock provide little information not already communicated by prices. In his concurring
decision, Commissioner Stone criticized the "binary treatment" of stocks as deliverable or
unalterably committed regardless of price. Id. at 27,302 (Comm'r Stone, concurring).
87 See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 116-33 (1993).
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available to them."' In the eyes of the court, the shorts were responsible
for their own predicament. This reasoning, like that in Indiana Farm
Bureau and Cox, implicitly assumes that the cost of making the uncertifi-
cated cotton deliverable was trivial; however, this is difficult to reconcile
with the behavior of the shorts in bidding up the futures price. In Indiana
Farm Bureau, the majority decision declared: "That shorts with no delivery
capacity chose to bid up the price rather than seek cash corn is not evidence
of manipulative activity on the part of the longs."' 9 The shorts were
irresponsible, and thus the price change was largely attributable to them;
they had no business staying short that late in the delivery month. In Cox,
the commissioners also substantially blamed the shorts who kept their
positions open without preparing for delivery for any resulting price
increase.
90
These decisions conflict sharply with Cargill and Great Western, which
imply that shorts are not obligated to purchase fancy grades, or to go outside
the delivery market, in order to acquire deliverable supplies.9 The court's
decision in Cargill is especially instructive in this regard. The defendant in
Cargill argued:
[I]t is clear that if the long is not permtted to ask what, m his judgment,
is apnce reflecting the cost of bringing m wheat from outside, the futures
market is no longer reflecting the real supply-demand situation, but is
artificially low, and the pnces are therefore useless to the trade and
nation.Y2
In a stinging rebuke, the court replied: "It is this price [i.e., the price that
reflected the cost of out-of-town wheat] which was artificially high and
therefore useless to the trade and nation. "I
Indiana Farm Bureau, Cox, and Volkart contain no such limits on the
actions that shorts must take in order to satisfy the demands of a large long.
88. Voikart Bros. v Freeman, 311 F.2d 52, 60 (5th Cir. 1962) (emphasis added).
89. Indiana Farm Bureau, [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH)
21,796, at 27,289 n.18.
90. Cox, [1986-1989 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCII) 23,786, at 34,062
(July 15, 1987).
91. Cargill, Inc. v Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1165-66 (8th Cir. 1971); Great W Food
Distribs., Inc. v Brannan, 201 F.2d 476, 481 (7th Cir. 1953).
92. Cargill, 452 F.2d at 1173.
93. Id.
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These cases can be read to mean that if shorts can acquire supplies for
delivery-no matter how uneconomical the source-a large long can be
found innocent of a manipulation if the shorts fail to do so, but instead
consent to liquidate at high prices. The economic analysis of manipulation
reveals that such an interpretation would render any antimanipulation statute
meaningless.
Although there is some merit in giving shorts an incentive to take
actions (such as preparing for delivery) that mitigate a long's market power,
the wording in Indiana Farm Bureau, Cox, and Volkart is so broad that it
could provide considerable legal cover for a would-be manipulator. Note
that shorts with positions equal in total size to the manipulator's position
must remain in the market at the latter's sufferance. Even if shorts desire
to close their positions prior to the expiration of the contract, they cannot do
so unless the long sells to them. Thus, although the wording in Indiana
Farm Bureau, Cox, and Volkart suggests that shorts have the option to leave
the market unilaterally, this is not the case.
Moreover, if the failure of shorts to make delivery is considered
evidence of their culpability for a comer-and a fair reading of Indiana
Farm Bureau, Cox, and Volkart would clearly support such a position-it is
nearly impossible to find a long guilty of market power manipulation.
Recall that a profit maximizing manipulator liquidates some contracts at a
price that exceeds the competitive price, but at a price that is low enough to
make it rational for some shorts to liquidate rather than deliver. That is, the
manipulator exploits the fact that it is costly for the shorts to deliver in order
to "blackmail" them into liquidating at high prices. Because a successful
manipulation always involves a substantial number of liquidations, if the
failure of shorts to deliver is in itself considered sufficient to absolve a large
long from any responsibility for an artificial price, then by definition
manipulation cannot occur.
One may object that the causation theory advanced in Indiana Farm
Bureau (the Indiana Farm Bureau rule) is desirable because it gives shorts
an incentive to take actions that make manipulation less likely It is indeed
the case, under this rule, that shorts have a strong motive to take such
precautions and that this will reduce the vulnerability of futures markets to
manipulation. The relevant question, however, is whether it is efficient to
rely primarily upon the efforts of shorts to prevent manipulation, or whether
it is better instead to impose sanctions on longs who exercise market power
regardless of whether shorts take precautions or not.
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In order to answer this question, it is necessary to analyze how the
behavior of market participants changes when the different rules are
implemented. Under the Indiana Farm Bureau rule, shorts have no recourse
against a corner unless they take actions to secure deliverable supplies. As
interpreted in Cox, such actions may include the distortion of normal
commodity flows in order to enhance deliverable stocks.' Alternatively,
shorts may attempt to liquidate their futures positions long before the end of
the delivery period. Shorts possess greater flexibility in acquiring deliver-
able stocks the more time they have to make delivery This flexibility
reduces the marginal cost of delivery; therefore, a large long possesses less
market power when shorts attempt to liquidate early The large long's
market power is not necessarily eliminated, however.
Acting rationally under the Indiana Farm Bureau rule, shorts will take
precautions until the marginal cost of precautions equals the marginal
benefit. The marginal benefit of precautions equals the expected savings to
shorts attributable to a lower probability and a reduced severity of corners.
In this legal regime, rational shorts will take precautions that lead to
increases in deliverable stocks, premature termination of futures positions,
and excessive searching to obtain deliverable supplies relative to what would
occur in a legal regime that effectively deters the exercise of market power
by long traders. All of these actions are costly For example, continuously
holding large deliverable stocks of cor in Chicago may well reduce the
probability of manipulation, but it also leads to the construction and use of
more storage space in Chicago; the reduction of corn consumption outside
of Chicago; and the use of more railroad, barge, and trucking resources to
transport the extra corn to that city Similarly, early liquidation of futures
positions may reduce hedging effectiveness. Just as the possibility of
burglary induces homeowners to expend real resources on locks, alarms, and
guard dogs in order to reduce the likelihood of theft, the possibility of
mampulation induces shorts to expend real resources to reduce the likelihood
and severity of manipulation. These are the deadweight costs of the Indiana
Farm Bureau rule.95
94. Cox, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm. L. Fut. Rep. (CCII) 23,786, at34,062,
34,067
95. Fischel and Ross argue that manipulation is "self-deterring" because the possibility
of manipulation gives shorts a strong incentive to obtain additional deliverable supplies. See
Fischel & Ross, supra note 9, at 544 n.182. This is true, but it is not sufficient to justify
reliance upon short self-protection to deter market power manipulation. These actions by
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These deadweight costs are likely to be large. This conclusion is
strengthened when one recognizes that when deciding on the number of
precautions to take, shorts have very poor information. The number of
precautions taken by an individual short depends upon both the size of
positions held by long traders and the number of precautions taken by other
shorts. Individual shorts are likely to know little about either. As a
consequence of this poor information, the level of precautions taken will
differ dramatically from those that would be appropriate under the Indiana
Farm Bureau rule if knowledge were perfect. Therefore, given the vagaries
of information, shorts will sometimes take too many precautions under this
rule. Sometimes they will take too few 96 When shorts take too many
precautions, deadweight losses result in the form of excessive storage and
transportation costs. When shorts take too few precautions, comers with
their attendant deadweight losses will occur. Comers will occur because
under the Indiana Farm Bureau rule, longs know that they are immune from
sanction for maipulation when shorts take few precautions. 7 Thus,
shorts distort consumption and production decisions. Therefore, even if they markedly
reduce the frequency and severity of corners, it is more efficient to deter manipulation
through legal sanctions if the costs of deterring manipulation in this manner are smaller than
the deadweight costs attributable to the distortions inherent in short self-protection. In other
words, the fact that shorts take precautions against corners does not imply that legal
prohibitions against manipulation are superfluous, as suggested by Fischel and Ross. See td.
at 547-49.
96. Shorts may take few precautions for another reason as well. Specifically, if there
are many shorts, a "free rider" (i.e., externality) problem may exist. The preparations taken
by mdividual short A benefit other shorts because all shorts benefit from any action that
reduces the probability and severity of corners. However, short A will not take the benefits
accruing to other shorts into account when deciding upon the level of precautions to take. As
a result, the other shorts free ride off of A's efforts. Similarly, A free rides off of the efforts
of other shorts. It is well known that the existence of such a positive externality induces the
shorts to take too few precautions.
The existence of this type of free rider problem creates an incentive for a single trader
to consolidate all of the short positions and thereby internalize the externality This may not
be a practical response in futures markets. Wealth constraints and/or risk aversion may
preclude one trader from assuming the entire open interest. Moreover, in the present
regulatory environment, position limits would make it very difficult for a single individual
or firm to acquire all open short positions.
97 In essence, under Indiana Farm Bureau and Volkart it is axiomatic that if a corner
occurs, the shorts failed to take sufficient precautions. See generally Volkart Bros. v
Freeman, 311 F.2d 52 (5th Cir. 1962); Indiana Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n, [1982-1984
Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 21,796 (Dec. 17, 1982). Moreover, under
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substantial deadweight costs are inevitable if the Indiana Farm Bureau rule
becomes the recognized standard for deciding guilt in a manipulation case.
There are no analogous incentive distortions in a legal regime that
penalizes the exercise of market power by longs regardless of short
precautions. Deterring longs from exercising market power during the
delivery period does not confer market power on shorts.9" Thus, this form
of deterrence makes the market competitive during the delivery period. In
such a competitive market, if shorts are subject to severe penalties for
defaulting on their contractual obligations, they have incentive to bring the
socially optimal supplies to the delivery point, liquidate their contracts
efficiently, and search the right amount for cash supplies. As a result, the
only cost of sanctioning longs for the exercise of market power is the
administrative cost of enforcing antimampulation rules. 99 There are no
deadweight distortions analogous to those inherent under the Indiana Farm
Bureau rule. 10
these two decisions, such a failure on the part of shorts is sufficient to absolve the cornerer
from any legal responsibility Thus, taken to their logical conclusion, these decisions return
us to the laissez-faire regime that prevailed prior to the passage of the Gram Futures Act and
the CEA.
98. See Pirrong, supra note 15, at 359-60 (showing that manipulation by short traders
is extremely unlikely if conditions favor execution of long manipulation). Deterring long
manipulation, which has historically been far more prevalent than short manipulation,
essentially makes the market competitive during the delivery period. In other words, if a
corner is analogous to pulling on a rope, shorts who attempt to exercise market power at the
end of the delivery period will have as much success as someone who tries to push a rope.
99. The Indiana Farm Bureau rule may actually inflate the costs of enforcing
antimanipulation laws as well. In order to reach a verdict in a case under this rule, it is
necessary for the fact finder to determine whether the short took the proper precautions.
Such an investigation is costly, but would be unnecessary under the alternative rule that
simply proscribes the exercise of market power by longs regardless of the precautions taken
by shorts. Moreover, it is uncertain how much preparation by shorts is enough. This
inherent ambiguity is costly to resolve. Such resolution would be unnecessary under the
alternative rule. Finally, the Indiana Farm Bureau rule increases the returns to manipulation
because a cornerer can escape punishment if shorts are found culpable. This increase in the
returns to manipulation should increase its frequency, thereby increasing the number of cases
that arise under the anti-corner provisions of the CEA. All of these factors tend to make the
Indiana Farm Bureau rule more costly to implement than the alternative rule. As a result,
the Indiana Farm Bureau rule is likely to entail both higher deadweight costs due to excessive
precautions by shorts and higher litigation expenses.
100. The underlying reason for placing the onus for deterring manipulation on shorts in
Volkart, Indiana Farm Bureau, and Cox seems to be a fear that prosecuting manipulators
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would give shorts an incentive to evade their contractual obligations, which would
compromise the surety of performance on futures contracts. In Volkart, the New York Cotton
Exchange submitted an amicus curiae brief which stated that a finding of manipulation in that
case would allow shorts to escape their delivery obligation and, therefore, undermine the
markets. Volkart Bros. v Freeman, 311 F.2d 52, 57-58 (5th Cir. 1962). The court relied
upon similar reasoning m its decision:
The petitioners can be held to a purpose to create prices not responsive to the
forces of supply and demand only upon the assumption that shorts should not be
held to their contract obligation to deliver the cotton. For the respondents to
proceed on the assumption that the shorts should not be required to deliver at
maturity would be to put them m the position of regulating a gambling institution
rather than a legitimate futures exchange. That, of course, was not the intention
of the statutes prohibiting manipulation.
Id. at 60 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
This reasoning is specious. Imposing sanctions on large long traders who corner or
squeeze a market does not free shorts from their obligation to perform on their contracts.
Under the operation of a legal regime that imposes penalties on traders who exercise market
power, exchanges can (and should) continue to take strong measures to give shorts and longs
an incentive to perform. Although enforcing strict performance on contracts may allow a
large long to manipulate the market, see generally Friedman, supra note 67, such bad
behavior can be deterred by imposing sufficiently punitive sanctions on those who do so. In
other words, although the large penalties for defaulting on contracts facilitate manipulation,
it is a non sequiturto assert that sanctioning traders who exercise market power makes default
by shorts attractive. Sanctioning shorts for failure to perform and sanctioning longs for
cornering are two separate, independent, and mutually compatible actions.
The hostile attitude toward shorts expressed in Volkart, Indiana Farm Bureau, and Cox
echoes the sentiments of exchanges during the preregulation era of futures trading. During
this era, exchange members frequently blamed shorts for corners and argued that shorts
deserved no protection against the demands of large longs. For example, a CBOT committee
investigating an alleged barley corner asserted in 1869 that "the market is virtually cornered
by reason of parties selling that which they did not possess at the time of making their
contracts, and which they could not procure at the time of the maturity of such contracts."
7 U.S. FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 26, at 252 n.3. Similarly, the secretary of the
Minneapolis Chamber of Commerce (a grain exchange) stated:
[S]peakmg frankly, I would say that some of those who have cried out against
alleged manipulations in the markets have been conducting their own
business in a rather unintelligent fashion in permitting their hedges to remain until
the last hour, hedging grain that was not geographically so located to be
deliverable there, possibly grain that is not deliverable there.
2 U.S. FED. TRADE COMM'N, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ON THE GRAIN
TRADE: TERMINAL GRAIN MARKETS AND EXCHANGEs 17 (1920).
This reasoning contradicts the correct economic justification for futures markets.
Futures markets serve an important economic purpose because (1) they allow traders in all
markets (not just the delivery markets) to hedge their transactions by selling futures in a
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The foregoing analysis implies that the Indiana Farm Bureau rule is
more efficient than an alternative rule that punishes manipulators even if
shorts fail to take these precautions, if (and only if) the costs of precaution
and corners are less than the costs of detecting and pumshing traders who
exercise market power during the delivery period. Because it is possible to
detect and punish market power manipulators with ugh probability,' it
is possible to deter the exercise of market power at very low cost through the
use of an alternative legal rule that bans market power manipulation
regardless of the actions of shorts. As a result, it is highly unlikely that it
is cheaper to deter manipulation by inducing shorts to secure deliverable
supplies that are larger than would be optimal if all traders act competitively
than it is to deter manipulation by imposing sanctions on longs who exercise
market power. m  The Indiana Farm Bureau rule, which imposes the
primary manipulation deterrence burden on shorts, is therefore objection-
able.
The foregoing difficulties presented by Indiana Farm Bureau and Cox
do not exhaust the problems with the current doctrine of causation. Two
remaimng problems stand out. First, the use of market shares to establish
the market dominance of a large trader can be nusleading. Second, the case
law suggests that ownership of the deliverable commodity is essential to the
central location, and (2) traders with information about fundamentals can trade m order to
improve price informativeness without handling the actual commodity Both ofthese essential
functions require some traders to "sell what they do not possess." Therefore, blaming shorts
for squeezes imposes costs on those who are using the markets in a perfectly legitimate and
socially useful fashion. Moreover, the use of this logic to absolve cornerers from any
responsibility for the exercise of market power rewards those who impose these costs upon
the legitimate users.
101. See infra part V.B.
102. Steven Shavell argues that ex post deterrence (i.e., sanctioning manipulators after
they have exercised market power) dominates ex ante deterrence (i.e., imposing restrictions
such as position limits or intervening in the market before the end of the delivery period in
order to prevent the exercise of market power) for offenses that (1) are detected with high
probability; (2) cannot occur without the knowledge of the malfeasor; and (3) are executed
by individuals or firms with substantial wealth. See Steven Shavell, The Optimal Structure
of Law Enforcement, 36 J.L. & ECON. 255, 261-66 (1993). All three conditions occur in a
market power manipulation. See infra part V (demonstrating that corners have marked and
easily observed effects on prices and quantities). Moreover, corners require substantial
planning. Finally, only individuals or firms with large financial resources can corner a
market. Because they are almost certain to be detected, wealthy manipulators can be deterred
by levying substantial fines upon them.
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completion of a manpulation. Because a futures contract and possession of
deliverable supplies are perfect substitutes during the delivery period, this
suggestion is incorrect.
Consider the use of market share. In all of the major cases, the decision
makers have determined the fraction of the open positions owned by the
large trader. Although market share and changes in market share can reveal
important information,103 ownership of a large fraction of the open interest
is neither necessary nor sufficient for a successful manipulation. A trader
may own 100% of the outstanding positions, but this is of little importance
if the marginal cost of delivery is constant over the range of his position.
Alternatively, a trader may own a relatively small share but still exercise
market power if the marginal cost of delivery is increasing or if there are
enough other large traders.
Finally, the case law attaches considerable importance to the alleged
manipulator's ownership of the deliverable supply In Volkart, for instance,
the court averred: "In most, if not all of the cases in which a trader has been
adjudged guilty of manipulation, it has effectively controlled the spot
commodity to the extent necessary to enable it to convert its dominant long
futures position into an illegal corner or squeeze."'" In Cargill, the court
reasoned: "[A] corner amounts to nearly a monopoly of a cash community,
coupled with the ownership of long futures contracts m excess of the amount
of that commodity ,,105 Similarly, the AIA m Abrams stated:
It is when [the manipulator] knows, by virtue of his ownership of
deliverable supply, that supplies will be short that his actions may be
considered mampulative.
Unless respondent either physically controls most of the deliverable
supply for a given contract, or is otherwise privy to some "inside
information" it is not clear how [the respondent] could possibly know
what the potential deliverable supply will be at contract expiration. 10
Although none of these statements asserts that ownership of the
deliverable is necessary for manipulation, all strongly suggest that it may be
103. See infra part IV.C (discussing information revealed by market share and changes
in market share).
104. Volkart Bros. v Freeman, 311 F.2d 52, 59 (5th Cir. 1962).
105. Cargill, Inc. v Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1162 (8th Cir. 1971) (emphasis added).
106. Abrams, [1987-1990 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 24,408, at
35,785 (Feb. 8, 1989).
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very difficult to prove manipulation if the accused does not possess some of
the physical commodity It is clear, however, that a long futures position
and a unit of the deliverable commodity are equivalent in their contribution
to manipulative profit. This is true because both a futures contract and a unit
of the commodity represent a claim on the same commodity m the same
market at the same time. Thus, as a logical matter, such a plausible reading
of the cases is inconsistent with an understanding of the economics of
manipulation.
The reasoning inAbrams is particularly troubling. One can interpret the
statements made in Abrams to mean that a long m possession of the deliver-
able supply can readily purchase futures contracts at the competitive price
from shorts ignorant of this fact; other traders sell freely because they
perceive the open interest to be small compared with the deliverable supply,
which they presume to be held by competitive traders. Such a situation
would certainly benefit the long (as it did in Cargill, for instance), but there
are cases (the Hunt soybean 7 and Ferruzzi soybean'08 episodes, for
example) in which the long either owned no physical supplies, or knowledge
of the long's physical position was widespread when he entered the futures
market. Thus, secret ownership of the deliverable is not even necessary for
a long to acquire a dominant futures position. Moreover, if the trader can
acquire the physical commodity at the competitive price from those oblivious
to his intent, he should be able to acquire futures contracts at the competitive
price as well. As a result, the asymmetric treatment of the physical
commodity and futures contracts implicit in the AUJ's argument mn Abrams
is highly suspect.
Read more critically, the ALU's assertion is nonsense. If the term
"deliverable supplies" is interpreted narrowly to mean the stocks certified
regular for delivery, the claim is patently incorrect because exchanges
regularly publish deliverable supply figures. If the term is interpreted
broadly to mean those stocks that could be made deliverable (at unspecified
cost), it is clear that the large long could never know for certain "what the
107 See CFTC v Hunt, 591 F.2d 1211 (7th Cir. 1979); Reauthorization of the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Agricultural
Research and General Legislation of the Senate Comm. on Agriculture, Nutrition, and
Forestry, Part IL, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 214-16 (1978).
108. See Bruce Ingersoll, As CongressReturns, Will CFTC Feel the Squeeze on Soybean
Flap?, WALL ST. J., Aug. 22, 1989, at C1, Scott Kilman & Sue Shellenbarger, Soybeans
Sink as CBOTActs to Avert Squeeze, WALL ST. J., July 13, 1989, at C1.
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deliverable supply will be," no matter how much he owns; he just knows how
much shorts cannot deliver to him. This may be important information, but
it does not provide the certainty that the ALJ erroneously asserts is crucial to
a successful squeeze."°
In conclusion, major precedents concerning the evidence necessary to
determine causation m a manipulation case may provide substantial legal
shelter to a cornerer. Most importantly, the potential for the accused to refute
causation by convincing a court or commissioners that the deliverable supply
is large may allow him to escape unscathed. Indeed, because several cases
suggest that any supplies that shorts can physically make deliverable should
be included m the deliverable supply regardless of the cost of doing so, the
concept of deliverable supply is so elastic as to provide no meaningful check
on manipulative conduct. Moreover, because these cases can be interpreted
to mean that a short who pays a high price to escape his obligation to deliver
(regardless of the level of the marginal cost of delivery) is in fact the "cause"
of the artificial price, it may be impossible as a practical matter to find any
large long trader guilty of manipulation.
Like the current interpretations of price artificiality, one can make a very
strong case that several (although not all) causation precedents legalize de
facto manpulation. Moreover, the following section demonstrates that the
third leg of the prevailing doctrinal triad-intent-also places an extreme
burden on anyone attempting to prove mampulation.
3. Intent
"[Ilntent," stated the commissioners in Indiana Farm Bureau, "is the
essence of manipulation." ''1 Although requiring a finding of an intention
to create an artificial price in order to prove guilt is justifiable, the definition
of intent that has evolved over time is not. As is the case for price artificiality
109. The ALJ in Abrams also stated that because warehouse receipts can be retendered,
shorts can deliver an amount greater than the deliverable stocks on hand. Abrams, [1987-
1990 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 24,408, at 35,782. The ALl argued
that this would constrain the long's ability to influence price. Id. This reasoning is incorrect.
Warehouse receipts can be retendered only if the long who initially receives delivery sells
them. A profit maximizing manipulator who receives delivery of warehouse receipts would
only sell them at a price equal to the price at which he is willing to sell futures contracts.
Thus, retendered warehouse receipts do not represent an additional source of the deliverable
commodity
110. Indiana Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n, [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L.
Rep. (CCH) 21,796, at 27,282 (Dec. 17, 1982).
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and causation standards, the prevailing intent doctrine seems calculated to
permit manipulation in many circumstances. The prime culprits again are
Indiana Farm Bureau, Cox, Abrams, and Volkart, but the better reasoned
opunons in Cargill and Great Western muddy the waters somewhat as well;
indeed, errors in the later decisions stem largely from statements in the earlier
ones.
The major problem with the existing case law on intent concerns the
notion of a "natural" corner or squeeze. In Cargill, the court noted that
"[m]any squeezes do not involve intentional manipulation." ' They instead
arise when an unexpected shortage occurs due to drought, unusually high
demand, or transportation problems. Similarly, in Volkart, the court cited
the Federal Trade Commission's (FTC) landmark gram study from the 1920s
as authority for its claim that many squeezes are unintentional, again because
events unforeseen at the time a trader creates a position may subsequently
confer market power on that trader.12 Moreover, the Great Western court
also cited the authority of the FTC's study when the court asserted the
existence of an unpunishable, "unintentional corner. " ' "
It is a short, but incorrect, step from the assertion that exogenous events
may facilitate mampulation to the conclusion that if such an event occurs, a
trader who exerts market power cannot have intended the result. The Cargill
court did not take this step. In fact, the court deliberately rejected that
conclusion." 4  Thus, although the Cargill court recognized that natural
conditions facilitate some squeezes, the court also recognized that a long
trader cannot exploit these conditions. In Indiana Farm Bureau, however, the
majority of the commission drew the opposite conclusion. According to
Indiana Farm Bureau, the Bureau did not initiate its position with the intent
of manipulating; the Bureau was legitimately hedging instead."' 5 Between
the time the hedge was placed and the contract expired, however, conditions
evolved that placed the Bureau in a position to squeeze the market." 6 The
commission found the Bureau blameless for "seek[ing] the best price from the
111. Cargill, Inc. v Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1162 (8th Cir. 1971).
112. See Volkart Bros. v Freeman, 311 F.2d 52, 59 (5th Cir. 1962).
113. Great W Food Distribs., Inc. v Brannan, 201 F.2d 476, 479 (7th Cir. 1953)
(emphasis added).
114. See Cargill, 452 F.2d at 1173.
115. Indiana Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n, [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L.
Rep. (CCH) 21,796, at 27,286 (Dec. 17, 1982).
116. Id. at 27,285-86.
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existing situation"'17 and asserted that a "long has a contractual right to
stand for delivery or exact whatever price for its long position which a short
is willing to pay m order to avoid having to make delivery "11 The Volkart
court reasoned similarly 19
According to the CFTC's decision mlndiana Farm Bureau, one can infer
intent only if a trader deliberately "exacerbates the congestion" at contract
expiration."20 Exacerbating acts include buying additional futures positions
in the delivery period and intentionally decreasing the cash supply 121
Because a trader can amass a position that confers market power without
engaging in such acts, it is clear that this opinion-which has been cited as
authoritative in the two subsequent manipulation cases of Cox and Abrams-
permits manipulation in many circumstances. Only m a case like Cargill, in
which the firm engaged in just this sort of conduct, can one infer intent under
the guidelines established in Indiana Farm Bureau.
Together, these decisions imply that a trader's intent at the time he
initiates a futures position is relevant to determining whether his actions
during the delivery period are manipulative. It is readily apparent, however,
that a trader's state of mind when he creates a futures position has no bearing
on either his state of mind during the delivery period or whether he exercises
117 Id. at 27,285.
118. Id. at27,286.
119. See Volkart Bros. v Freeman, 311 F.2d 52, 59 (5th Cir. 1962).
120. Indiana Farm Bureau, [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCII)
21,796, at 27,285.
121. Id.
122. Indiana Farm Bureau contains other examples of peculiar reasoning as well.
The majority decision noted that the Bureau utilized the corn delivered to it to satisfy
outstanding sales commitments and claimed that this demonstrated that the Bureau's
actions were commercially legitimate. Id. at 27,286. This is balderdash. The analysis
in Part Ell implies that a trader with an outstanding short position (like the Bureau) is an
especially dangerous manipulator because he has already acquired a plot m which to bury
the corpse. In Volkart, the defendants shorted deferred futures, similarly "insuring" the
firm against a drop in price after the termination of the squeeze. Volkart, 311 F.2d at
57 The Commissioners' assertion in Indiana Farm Bureau also overlooks the fact that
the Bureau liquidated a large number of contracts even though it still had some sales
commitments that remained open. If the futures market was truly the cheap source of
corn (as the Commissioners' logic requires), and if the Bureau needed more corn to
satisfy its sales requirements, the Bureau should have taken more deliveries. This
reasoning suggests that the Commissioners possessed only a dim understanding of how
manipulation works.
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market power m the delivery month. The doctrine of a "natural" squeeze
provides a large trader with a manipulation option; if the trader creates a large
long position for a legitimate hedging or speculative purpose, the trader can
exercise his option to squeeze the market if conditions subsequently change
to make manipulation profitable. One can imagme the havoc that would result
if judges were to find only those who meticulously planned a murder guilty
of the crime and to free those who merely killed impulsively when the
opportumty presented itself. The precedents in manipulation law create the
conditions for such chaos m futures markets.
The reasoning m Abrams presents still further difficulties to any attempt
to prove manpulative intent. In Abrams, the AD concluded: "Abrams'
actions were taken with the purpose of extracting the best possible price for
his long positions, which he established after correctly divining the market's
future direction. Under the Commission's precedents, Abrams did nothing
beyond what speculators normally do, and indeed must do to make markets
function. "'" If widely adopted, tis reasoning will have mischievous
implications. If a rise in price during the delivery period is interpreted merely
as evidence of a speculator's prescience in "divining the market's future
direction," a large long can effectively escape conviction even if he does
manipulate the market. 24 A successful manipulation causes the price to
rise. Abrams implies that a rise in price is sufficient to deny any intent to
manipulate the market because the long can cite tis price increase as evidence
of his legitimate speculative motives for buying futures. If a price rise is
considered dispositive evidence of legitimate speculative intent, and if a
finding of manipulative intent is necessary to convict a cornerer, application
of the reasoning in Abrams makes it impossible to convict a successful
manipulator.
Another difficulty with the prevailing view of intent is the emphasis
placed on ownership of the deliverable commodity before the completion of
a squeeze. Cargill, Great Western, Volkart, Indiana Farm Bureau, and
Abrams all mention the importance of the ownership of deliverable stocks in
determining mtent.12s Again, because such ownership is neither necessary
123. Abrams, [1987-1990 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 24,408, at
35,786 (Feb. 8, 1989).
124. Id.
125. See Cargill, Inc. v Hardin, 452 F.2d 476, 480 (8th Cir. 1971); Volkart Bros.
v Freeman, 311 F.2d 52, 59 (5th Cir. 1962); Great W Food Distribs., Inc. v Brannan,
201 F.2d 476, 480 (7th Cir. 1953); Abrams, [1987-1990 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut.
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nor sufficient for a successful manipulation, this emphasis is misplaced and
highly misleading. Because a manipulator must take deliveries of virtually the
entire deliverable stock, ownership of this stock after the expiration of a
futures contract is strong evidence that a particular trader intended to comer
the market. Thus, courts and the CFTC have focused on the deliverable stock
at an inappropriate time.
In conclusion, the precedents concerning intent provide a would-be
manipulator with considerable latitude. As long as a would-be manipulator
can demonstrate a legitimate intent for initiating a futures position (e.g.,
hedging or informed speculation) and does not purchase the deliverable com-
modity, the would-be manipulator can utilize these precedents m his defense.
4. Summary
The existing judicial and regulatory decisions on manipulation resemble
a rickety three-legged stool that is ready to collapse under the slightest weight.
Each leg-artificial price, causation, and mtent-is rotted through. Taken
collectively, the relevant decisions (especially the most recent ones-Indiana
Farm Bureau, Cox, and Abrams) (1) make it difficult to employ the most
valuable evidence concerning price distortions; (2) obscure the determinants
of market power; and (3) make it possible for those who intend to exercise
market power in the delivery period effectively to deny tis intent. With such
a collection of precedents, it is no wonder that some believe that the
prosecution of manipulation is futile.'26
It is important to note that the prevailing confusion does not simply
jeopardize expost prosecutions of accused manipulators. The confusion also
undermines the foundations for interventions by regulators and exchanges,
such as emergency actions and forced liquidation (as occurred in the 1989
Ferruzzi episode).27 Any exchange or regulatory body that attempts to force
a particular trader to liquidate a position because of a fear of an impending
manipulation runs the risk that the accused will challenge the action on the
ground that existing precedents imply that his actions do not satisfy the
L. Rep. (CCII) 24,408, at 35,782-85; Indiana Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n, [1982-1984
Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 21,796, at 27,285 (Dec. 17, 1982).
126. See infra note 138 and accompanying text.
127 The CFTC did not order an emergency action m the Ferruzzi episode; rather,
the CBOT did. According to Commissioner Fowler West, the CFTC did not act because
it had adopted a definition of manipulation that was so cramped that it was "virtually
impossible" to prove the existence of a squeeze. Ingersoll, supra note 108, at Cl.
COMMODITY MARKET MANIPULATION LAW
established criteria of price artificiality, causation, or intent. It is certainly
possible that a court will accept the challenge and overturn the emergency
action. Moreover, although subsequent appeals may reinstate the emergency
order, given the time required to complete appeals, it is almost certain that the
futures contract will expire (and the manipulation succeed) before the process
ends. If the trader successfully stalls emergency intervention through the
courts, the trader need only worry about ex post adjudication. Given the
ughly favorable odds that the existing precedents provide, the prospect of ex
post adjudication may be less than daunting.
C. Legal Commentary on Manipulation Law
Given the foregoing analysis, it is unsurprising that the literature on
manpulation case law is almost uniformly critical. Some of these criticisms
overlap those that I have just made, while others are quite different. The most
important difference between these criticisms and mine is that several
commentators strongly object to the law's reliance on evidence of price
artificiality in deciding manipulation cases. 12 In contrast, I consider this
evidence crucial.
The legal commentators focus on intent or conduct and either deigrate
the importance of establishing price artificiality m mampulation litigation or
fail to provide any tests to establish the existence of price abnormalities that
address the problems raised by Cox and Indiana Farm Bureau. As a result,
the proposed alternatives do not provide a complete methodology that a court
can apply to determine whether a particular set of facts supports the
conclusion that a trader manipulated the market.
For example, Wendy Perdue proposes the following "price impact" test:
Did the trader act as he did in the expectation that Is action would affect the
market price? But for the anticipated price increase would the trader have
engaged in this conduct?129 Richard Friedman modifies Perdue's formula-
tion by adding the following question: "If the only sanction for a short's
default [on a futures contract] were the ordinary measure of contract damages,
would the long trader have withheld supply to a lesser extent than he
did?"" Edward McDermott proposes a conduct-based test. Calling for a
128. See supra part IV.B.1.
129. See Perdue, supra note 54, at 393 ("Prices reflect the conclusions reached by
traders after weighing the innumerable conditions that traders consider relevant to
predicting future prices.").
130. Friedman, supra note 67, at 51.
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test analogous to the common-law standard of hindrance, McDermott argues
that a long manipulates only if the long "engages in unjustifiable economic
transactions [during the delivery period]. In effect, the long buys or
threatens to take delivery of the same product twice." 31 In reasoning that
parallels that in Indiana Farm Bureau, McDermott considers purchases of
additional cash or futures contracts during the delivery period to be a
hindering action that provides evidence of manpulative intent. 132 McDer-
mott also argues that holding a futures position that is larger than the
deliverable stock is also evidence of manipulative intent.
133
These tests do not overcome the obstacles to a successful prosecution of
a cornerer laid by the decisions in Indiana Farm Bureau and Cox. Most
importantly, although Perdue's alternative is eminently defensible as a test for
intent, it is incomplete because it does not allow a fact finder to determine
whether the alleged conduct actually had any impact on price. Moreover,
because Perdue attempts to discredit the main means of establishing whether
anyone's conduct had an impact on price, she creates a standard that relies
upon proof of intent to raise prices without proof that such an increase in price
actually occurred. 134
Furthermore, it is extraordinarily difficult to prove intent (and thus, to
implement Perdue's test) without relying upon price data to demonstrate the
existence of artificiality 135 The defendant can claun other motives for his
conduct; therefore, it is necessary to compare the observable implications of
the defendant's explanation for his conduct with the inplications of the
alternative explanation that he acted in order to squeeze the market. Because
price effects are among the most important of these implications, that Perdue
discredited the utility of price data undermines the most effective means of
carrying out her test.
In contrast, Friedman does not discount the use of price data to determine
whether a manipulation occurred. To the contrary, he notes that manipulation
necessarily distorts prices and, therefore, argues that price data can be very
helpful in establishing whether an offense occurred.13 Friedman's proposed
test is a useful means of refining the inquiry into intent, with the added
131. McDermott, supra note 28, at 214.
132. See id. at 204-05, 214-19.
133. See id.
134. See supra notes 55-56 4nd accompanying text.
135. See infra part V.B.1.
136. See Friedman, supra note 67, at 54-57
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advantage that Friedman (unlike Perdue) does not rule out the examination of
the most powerful evidence available to inplement Ins test. However, given
the current state of manipulation case law and legal commentary and the
resulting confusion and suspicion surrounding what constitutes an artificial
price, Friedman's test alone is an insufficient foundation upon which to erect
a complete legal analysis of manipulation. Moreover, the measure of damages
that Friedman uses to motivate his analysis equals the difference between the
market price and the but-for-mampulation competitive price. 137 Friedman's
test requires the fact finder to quantify the price distortion. Determining this
distortion without relying upon the historical data analysis discredited in
Indiana Farm Bureau and Cox is problematic, to say the least. Thus,
implementation of Friedman's test of intent requires a rehabilitation of the
price artificiality doctrine.
McDermott's conduct test also fails to address the fundamental problems
with manipulation law Because McDermott's test relies upon deliberate,
exacerbating conduct during the delivery period, it is subject to the same
criticism as the Indiana Farm Bureau decision. Namely, a squeeze can
succeed even if the manipulator does not engage in this aggravating conduct.
Moreover, the other form of conduct that McDermott deems mampula-
tive-holding a position in the delivery month that exceeds the deliverable
stock-requires measurement of this quantity and the definition of the relevant
market. As the preceding analysis makes clear, this raises intractable
difficulties.
Still other commentators despair altogether of establishing any test or
standard that judges can employ to determine whether a defendant has
manipulated the market. 38 These scholars conclude that it is necessary to
replace ex post adjudication with expansive ex ante restrictions on trader
conduct. This alternative regulatory structure resembles a civil code system
of justice; it attempts to foresee every eventuality, to define clearly the line
between allowed and disallowed behavior before any case has arisen, and to
intervene while a transgression is in progress.
This view is subject to severe criticism on the grounds that it discards
valuable information about the economic effects of any trader's actions that
is available only after the fact. Both an expost and an ex ante fact finder can
determine whether a particular trader engaged in a particular form of conduct.
Only the expost fact finder, however, can determine whether that conduct had
137 See id. at 48.
138. See Davidson, supra note 4, at 1297; Markham, supra note 4, at 361-76.
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detrimental economic effects. Moreover, only an ex post fact finder can
observe (1) whether the price in the delivery market plunged after the end
of an alleged manipulation, (2) whether the accused manipulator sold the
commodity immediately after the delivery period, and (3) whether the
accused manipulator both took deliveries and sold futures contracts. The
first observation is a crucial test of whether a manipulation occurred, while
the second and third observations are necessary to determine whether the
accused manipulator acted with manipulative intent. Thus, if closely related
forms of conduct can have widely divergent economic effects, ex post
adjudication dominates because it can exploit more information. Ex post
adjudication is more discriminating and less likely to demoralize legitimate
actions that are difficult to differentiate from illegitimate ones on the basis
of information available before the end of the delivery period.'39
If some forms of conduct are uniformly harmful, there is little
difference between ex post and ex ante measures. The case law and legal
scholarship clearly demonstrate, however, that no one has yet established
such a "smoking gun," conduct-based test. This is not surprising. An action
(e.g., buying a large number of futures contracts or taking deliveries of large
quantities) that is manipulative in one set of circumstances is innocuous in
others because changeable underlying fundamental conditions (e.g., supply
m the delivery market and transportation costs) affect a market's response
to a trader's actions. Given these difficulties, there is no reason to believe
that broad proscriptions of various forms of conduct will provide benefits (in
the form of manipulation deterrence) that more than offset the costs resulting
from demoralization of legitimate trading activity Putting the issue in the
form of a question, if conduct alone is sufficient to infer intent and effect,
and the undesirable forms of conduct are known and identifiable, why have
the courts not simply proscribed these actions? Moreover, why should
regulators be able to detect and deter these actions with less information ex
ante than the courts have available ex post?
In sum, legal scholars have identified many flaws in the existing law of
commodity market manipulation. They have not, however, provided a
viable alternative set of standards and tests that would improve the perfor-
mance of courts and regulators. Most importantly, despite numerous
assertions to the contrary, the suggested alternatives to the existing rules fail
to provide a reliable methodology to determine whether a manipulation
139 See Shavell, supra note 102, at 261-66 (discussing criteria that imply that ex
post deterrence of manipulation is preferable to ex ante deterrence).
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actually occurred. Conduct-based standards require no analysis of price
effects, but are overinclusive. Moreover, the demals of some authors
notwithstanding, intent-based standards are dependent upon a price analysis.
Those advancing such standards fail to show, however, how such an analysis
should be carried out (if they do not demgrate price analysis altogether).
Although far from encouraging, the analysis of court cases and legal
commentary should not be considered as grounds for complete despair. It
is not inherently impossible to determine whether a particular trader has
exercised market power. Rather, certain decision makers have smply failed
to understand the workings of manipulation and have strayed into logical
dead ends as a result. I concur with Richard Friedman's assessment:
I prefer to hope, until hope appears vain, that the apparent intractability
in mampulation litigation does not inhere in the subject but results from
a failure to understand it. Asking the right questions, ones that accurately
describe the phenomenon at issue, will make the factfinder's task easier,
and in any event far more rational. 14
The following Part presents an economically defensible antimampulation
doctrine by relying upon the analysis of manipulation contained in my earlier
work and outlined in Part HI. In Part V, I attempt, as Friedman suggests,
"to ask the right questions." Most importantly, I wed the predictions of the
manipulation model to classical statistical hypothesis testing techniques to
create a reliable methodology to determine whether a trader exercised market
power. This methodology also allows a fact finder to implement the tests of
intent derived by Friedman and Perdue. Thus, my methodology both
expands upon and complements existing analyses of manipulation law
V An Alternative Manipulation Deterrence Doctrine
A. Introduction
The proper objective of an antimampulation strategy is to deter the
exercise of market power in derivative product markets. To do so, an ex
post deterrence mechanism must be able to deterinne reliably whether a
manpulation has occurred and to assign liability for this conduct. In this
Part, I propose a methodology that allows a decision maker to perform these
tasks with considerable precision.
140. Friedman, supra note 67, at 60.
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B. An Alternative Test for Market Manipulation
The detection of manipulation and assignment of liability to a
particular trader require answers to three questions:
1. What is the probability that competitive interactions between
traders produced the observed market outcomes?
2. If competitive interactions were unlikely, is the accused trader's
conduct consistent with the exercise of market power?
3. Are there any nonmampulative explanations for this conduct?
If the answer to Question 1 is a small number, an investigator may
infer with confidence that some trader or traders exercised market power.
Question 2 ailms to identify a particular trader acting in a noncompetitive
fashion. Question 3 examines whether there is some alternative explanation
for his conduct.
In many respects, the structure of these questions parallels the
structure of the existing law discussed earlier. Question 1 corresponds to
price artificiality, Question 2 corresponds to causation, and Question 3
corresponds to intent. Thus, one can view the analysis that follows as a
rehabilitation of the existing doctrine. Given the disreputable state of that
doctrine, however, it is desirable to wipe the slate clean and discard the old
terms to prevent them from contaminating the new analysis. Moreover, the
questions focus the issues more clearly on the relevant issue of market
power at contract expiration than the original three terms do. This should
reduce the probability that inquiries based on these questions will go astray,
as have those based on the original classification.
1. Answenng Question I
The analysis in Part III presents five economic effects of manipulation.
By undertaking a systematic empirical examination (using established
statistical methodology) of these symptoms or implications, it is possible
to quantify the likelihood that some trader has exercised market power.
This is accomplished by testing the null hypothesis that all traders
acted competitively at expiration of a particular contract where manipula-
tion is suspected. Under the null hypothesis, the price, shipment and
receipt, and delivery patterns during the expiration period should be
statistically indistinguishable from the past patterns exhibited in that
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market. Under the alternative hypothesis that manipulation occurred, the
five effects are pronounced.14 1  Given the historical variability in the
relevant variables, one can calculate the probability of falsely rejecting the
null hypothesis. That is, one can calculate the likelihood of incorrectly
finding a competitive trader guilty of exercising market power. Because
(1) the specific hypotheses tested are derived from a rigorous model of the
effects of manipulation and competition on prices and (2) the testing
methods are the standard ones employed in both the social and physical
sciences, this proposed standard addresses the criticisms raised in Cox,
Indiana Farm Bureau, and the legal literature and avoids the ad hoc
reasoning implicit in the alternatives proposed in these decisions. 42
An examination of the relevant implications shows that they represent
an enhanced price artificiality standard. The standard is enhanced because
it relies upon quantity data (delivery point receipts and shipments and the
number of deliveries) as well as price data. By utilizing historical data and
universally accepted statistical hypothesis-testingtechmques, aninvestigator
can determine the probability that the prices and quantities observed during
an alleged manipulation were the result of competitive behavior by all
traders. If the estimated probability is very small, one may reliably infer
that a manipulation occurred. Because these tests are likely to be
statistically powerful, especially in combination, this methodology can
separate competitive and manipulative episodes with a high degree of
precision.
An example demonstrates how these tests can be employed and how
very powerful they can be. In particular, consider a test of Implications 1
141. It is, of course, possible to reverse the null and alternative hypotheses. That is,
one could treat the hypothesis that a particular contract was manipulated as the null. This
reversal essentially shifts the burden of proof to the defendant. Under this hypothesis, if
the statistical tests are met, then manipulation would be presumed unless the defendant
could provide evidence to support an alternative explanation. It is clear that the question
of who bears the burden of proof is important. However, it is not the objective of this
Article to answer that question. Instead, my objective is to create a methodology that can
be employed to determine reliably whether a manipulation occurred. The validity and
power of this methodology is independent of who bears the burden of proof.
142. Indeed, the observable implications of the manipulation model and the data
available to test them are far more exact than those employed in other types of cases in
which similar issues arise. In particular, the contrast between the clearness of these
implications and tests and those employed in antitrust cases is strikingly evident.
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and 4.143 Recall that these implications state that during a manipulation,
the spot price first should rise precipitously relative to the deferred futures
price and then should fall even more precipitously at the end of corner.
In April 1991, there was an allegation of a corner in zinc, which is
traded on the London Metal Exchange.'" From April 10 to April 15,
1991, the spot price of zinc rose 11.6%.145 During this same period, the
price of zinc for delivery in three months, the deferred futures price, fell
1.7% Thus, as one would expect to occur during a manipulation, the spot
price rose appreciably, more than 13 %, relative to the futures price.
The corner ended on April 15, 1991. The next day the spot price of
zinc fell 10%, while the futures price fell by 0.1%. On April 17, the spot
price fell by another 1.97%, while the futures price declined again by only
0.1 %. This price pattern is strongly consistent with the burying the body
effect, which is symptomatic of manipulation.
Figure 1 illustrates the price pattern over the relevant period. Note the
dramatic "spike" in the spot price and the lack of movement in the forward
price. Also note that the spot price after the end of the corner was lower
than it was prior to the alleged corner.
143. See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text (setting forth five implications of
manipulation).
144. I focus on this episode because while working with my colleague, Victor Ng, I
have closely studied the dynamics of industrial metals prices. See generally Victor K. Ng
& S. Craig Pirrong, Fundamentals and Volatility: Storage, Spreads, and the Dynamics of
Metals Prices, 67 J. Bus. 203 (1994). I can speak with some authority about this market
because I have considerable familiarity with the behavior of zinc prices.
145. All reported percentage price changes (returns) have been stripped of their
predictable components. The reported returns are equal to actual returns net of the
expected return. Such returns are sometimes called "residual" returns. The use of residual
returns is motivated by the fact that some fraction of price movements on a given date t can
be predicted using information available on date t-1. Such information incudes past price
changes and past price levels. In the zinc data, Ng and Pirrong estimate this predictable
component using an ordinary least squares regression model. As is the case for most
financial data, a very small fraction of the movements in zinc returns are predictable; past
price changes and price levels explain less than 2% of the variation in zinc spot and forward
prices. Thus, observed price changes are almost identical to price changes net of the
predicted price changes. Moreover, since residual returns have been stripped of their
predictable components, the expected residual return equals zero. The data on changes in
deliverable stocks have also been stripped of their predictable components through the use
of a regression model. As a result, the expected change in stocks under the null hypothesis
is zero.
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Figure 2 plots the difference between the logarithms of spot and
forward prices-the difference in the log transformed prices essentially
measures the spread as a percentage of the spot price. 146  This price
difference is called the "spread" in the argot of commodities markets. This
figure shows clearly the large increase in the spot price relative to the
forward price. It also shows that the ratio between the spot and forward
prices was lower after the alleged comer than before-the spot price fell
relative to the forward price. The pattern illustrated in the figures is,
therefore, consistent with the existence of a comer in zinc.
In order to implement fully the proposed methodology, it is necessary
to compare these relative price changes, which are superficially consistent
with a comer, to some measure of the "natural" variability of prices. If the
spot price of zinc was extremely variable relative to its futures price (e.g.,
on the order of 5 % per day) even if all traders had acted competitively, the
price changes observed in the April 10-April 17 period may have occurred
with a high probability even if no one had manipulated the market. Thus,
one can confidently reject the null hypothesis of no-manipulation only if the
observed price changes were large relative to their normal variation.
The traditional measure of variability is the standard deviation. In this
context, the standard deviation measures the average deviation of actual
price changes from their expected value of zero. Therefore, the larger the
observed price change is relative to the standard deviation, the smaller the
probability that the price change resulted from chance, rather than from a
manipulation.
Based on a model of spot and futures price dynamics that allows .the
standard deviations of spot and forward prices, and the correlation between
these prices, to vary with fundamental supply and demand conditions, 47
146. The spread also corrects for the effects of interest rates and the costs of warehousing
zinc. For details, see Ng & Pirrong, supra note 144, at 207, 217-18.
147 See id. Specifically, the model adjusts standard deviations to reflect the fact that
even in competitive markets, spot and futures prices become more variable, and vary more
independently, when the spot price is high relative to the futures price. This is true because
the spot price increases relative to the futures price when supply conditions tighten (holding
demand constant) or demand increases (holding supply constant). Thus, although a rise in
the spot price relative to the futures price could signal an impending comer, it could also
reflect a natural tightening of supply conditions, which would tend to make prices more
volatile. Given that a comer causes the spot price to rise relative to the futures price, use
of this model tends to favor an accused manipulator. In particular, under the null hypothesis,
the model attributes the initial rise in the spot price-forward price ratio to a fundamental
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the increase in the ratio of the spot price to the forward price over the
period April 10-April 15 was six standard deviations away from the change
that would be expected under competition. Under the null of competition,
such a large gap between observed prices and their expected value would
occur by chance with a probability of 0.0011. Similarly, the relative price
decrease during the period April 16-April 17 was 4.44 standard deviations
below the expected value (under the competitive null) of zero. If all agents
in the zinc market acted competitively, this would occur by chance with a
probability of 0.0039 Thus, if all traders were acting competitively in the
period April 10-April 17, the large increase in relative price and the
subsequent large decrease in relative price were both extremely unusual
events. Together, they were truly extraordinary The probability that they
both would have occurred if all traders had acted competitively equals
0.0000044. Thus, these data overwhelmingly reject the null hypothesis that
no manipulation occurred in the zinc market in April 1991 and favor the
alternative that the market was squeezed.
In other words, the data reject the null hypothesis at a confidence level
of 0.00044% This is far higher than the 1% and 5% levels of confidence
commonly employed in scientific work. This implies that if a trader were
found guilty of manipulation of the zinc market on the basis of this
evidence, the odds of a wrongful conviction would be on the order of four
chances in one million. 
48
shock to supply or demand conditions and increases the estimated standard deviation of spot
and forward prices. The increase in these statistics makes the price plunge that is attributable
to the burying the corpse effect seem less unusual. The example in the text shows that despite
this advantage to the accused, the statistical test for the existence of a comer can be extremely
powerful.
148. The null can be rejected at any level of confidence. This is a choice variable for the
court. This choice corresponds to the selection of a burden of persuasion. A "preponderance
of the evidence" standard corresponds to a wide confidence interval (e.g., 50%). A "beyond
a reasonable doubt" standard corresponds to a narrow confidence interval (e.g., 5 % or 1%).
It is not my aim to establish the appropriate standard of proof. Again, my objective is to
create a set of tests that can be employed under any proof standard. However, the example
just discussed shows that the effects of manipulation can be so pronounced that even a very
strict standard is not insurmountable. Because it is most beneficial to deter the most
egregious episodes of manipulation, and because the costs of demoralizing legitimate trading
activity through the use of a low threshold may be large, a narrow confidence interval is
likely to be optimal. The court in Great Western stated that a preponderance of the evidence
is necessary in order to sustain a conviction for manipulation. Great W Food Distribs., Inc.
v Brannan, 201 F.2d. 476, 479 (7th Cir. 1953).
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Some other available data bolster the conclusion that the zinc market
was cornered. In particular, consistent with Implication 2,149 the deliver-
able stocks of zinc rose dramatically between April 10 and April 18, 1991.
This implies that receipts of zinc to exchange warehouses rose, shipments
of zinc from these warehouses fell during this week, or both. Correcting
for how changes in stocks in one week are related to changes in previous
weeks and for the effect of the difference between spot and futures prices,
these stocks rose by 40% during the week of the alleged corner. This is
more than forty standard deviations away from the expected value of zero.
Given the variability of changes in deliverable supplies observed in the
data, the probability that such a large increase in stocks would occur by
chance is of the magnitude of the probability that an individual will be
struck by lightning. Thus, the deliverable stock data are also inconsistent
with the hypothesis that nothing unusual happened in the zinc market in
mid-April 1991. Like the price evidence just discussed, the increase in
deliverable stocks is therefore strongly consistent with the view that the
zinc market was manipulated during that period.
Viewed together, the observed behavior of prices and deliverable
stocks provides even stronger evidence of a squeeze. Recall from Part III
that the theory of storage implies that in competitive markets, the spot price
shouldfall relative to the forward price when stocks increase dramatically
The spread between forward and spot prices measures the return to storing
the commodity This is true because the forward price must rise relative
to the spot price in order to make storage of additional quantities of a
commodity profitable. In the present case, however, we observe the exact
opposite. Although contrary to what one would expect to observe in a
competitive market, the simultaneous movement of prices and stocks in
zinc in April 1991 are exactly what one would expect to observe during a
market power manipulation. Thus, when considered jointly, the price and
deliverable stock evidence provides even stronger support for the alterna-
tive hypothesis of market power manipulation in this episode.
This brief overview of an analysis of the events in the zinc market
clearly demonstrates how price and quantity data can be used to determine
the probability that a market was cornered. I have already addressed some
common objections to this methodology The example shows that these
149. See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text (setting forth five implications of
manipulation).
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criticisms are irrelevant to the analysis of a large manipulation. These are
just the corners that it is most beneficial to deter. It should also be noted
that the elimination of large manipulations also improves the ability to
detect smaller ones. Recall that this methodology implicitly assumes that
a competitive process generates the observed historical data. If some past
episodes of manipulation contaminate the data, they are "noisier" and,
therefore, less powerful as a means of detecting the existence of a corner
or a squeeze; this is especially true in the case of smaller manipulations.
The employment of a reliable set of tests for market power, however, will
deter the more dramatic squeezes. This, in turn, reduces the noisiness of
the data. The data can then be used to detect less pronounced mampula-
tions that were difficult to distinguish statistically before the larger
manipulations were deterred. These smaller corners are now detectable
and deterrable, which reduces the noisiness of the data further still. Thus,
the adoption of a reliable set of manipulation tests commences a bootstrap-
ping process that largely renders null and void the criticism that historical
data contaminated by past episodes of market power are an unreliable
means of establishing price abnormalities allegedly resulting from
manipulation.
In carrying out such an investigation, it is necessary to distinguish
between "surprise" mampulations (such as those alleged in Cargill, Indiana
Farm Bureau, and Cox) that occur during the last moments of futures
trading for a particular contract and those that manifest themselves prior to
this time. This is true because the implications of the two types of
manipulation are somewhat different. The possibility that traders become
aware of a mampulation only gradually dictates how an investigator must
implement the tests of these implications. Most importantly, tests of
Implications 1 and 3150 require comparisons of relative price levels during
the delivery period rather than relative price changes prior to that time
because the normal noise in prices is likely to obscure the gradual trend in
relative prices. This does not imply that relative price changes are
irrelevant altogether, however. Tests of Implication 4' can utilize price
change data because spot price declines (absolute and relative) in the
150. See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text (setting forth five implications of
manipulation).
151. See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text (setting forth five implications of
manipulation).
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delivery market are likely to occur very rapidly after the end of a mampula-
tion.
Moreover, it is necessary to replace Implication 4 with:
S4. The futures price rises relative to delivery market spot bids
at the time that the manipulator liquidates his position.
This implication requires some comment. The use of cash-futures compari-
sons has been criticized 52 because cash and futures prices are supposed
to converge during the delivery period. To the extent that a manipulation
is anticipated, this is correct, which is why the original implications
discussed above exclude any comparison of the expiring futures price and
delivery market spot prices. During an anticipated manipulation, shorts bid
up the spot price to equal the futures price because they can extinguish their
position either by purchasing the deliverable and tendering it or by buying
a futures contract. In equilibrium, the costs of these actions must be equal.
Given the nature of most spot price data, however, it is quite possible that
convergence does not occur in a surprise squeeze. Spot price data for most
physical commodities including grains, petroleum products, and metals,
consist of bids to purchase the commodity rather than transaction prices
determined in transparent competitive auctions. As a result, these prices
tend to be somewhat "sticky " Although this feature is frequently a source
of criticism of these data, it is quite important in this context. Bidders do
not react immediately to surprise events, such as a last minute squeeze, so
the occurrence of such an event causes an unusual divergence between spot
and futures prices. If other factors (e.g., weather news or information
about demand) can be excluded as a cause of the futures price shock, an
unusually large spot-futures divergence is inconsistent with competitive
behavior by all market participants. Moreover, the failure of spot bids to
rise dramatically subsequent to the increase in the futures price at contract
expiration, the failure of the deferred futures price to rise at this time, or
both make it highly unlikely that exogenous factors caused the rise in the
expiring futures price. One can again analyze historical data using classical
methods to estimate the probability that a rise of a given size in the expiring
152. See Joseph J. Bianco, The Mechanics of Futures Trading: Speculation and
Manipulation, 6 HOFSTRA L. REV 27, 28-29 (1977); Philip M. Johnson, Commodity Market
Manipulation, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REv 725, 752 (1981); Lower, supra note 54, at 393-94
(citing Bianco, supra, at 29); McDermott, supra note 28, at 211, Perdue, supra note 54, at
368.
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futures prices is not followed by a similar rise in the spot price or
accompanied by a similar rise in the deferred future.
One potential difficulty in diagnosing a surprise squeeze is that if one
occurs, shorts may not have time to acquire supplies elsewhere to make
deliveries. Therefore, Implications 2 and 5153 do not hold for this type
of squeeze.
Finally, use of the quantity data requires some care. In particular,
because many commodities against which futures are traded (e.g., grains)
exhibit pronounced seasonal variations in shipments, receipts, and stocks,
it is necessary to correct for this seasonality Moreover, because delivery
point receipts and shipments frequently show considerable positive
autocorrelation (i.e., rises (or declines) tend to be followed by rises (or
declines)), tests of Implications 2 and 5 are likely to be very powerful
because these implications imply a negative autocorrelation around the end
of the delivery period. That is, in contrast to their normal pattern, during
a corner increases (or declines) tend to be followed by declines (or
increases).
In conclusion, market power leaves telltale footprints in the form of
distorted prices, shipments, receipts, and deliveries. The price and
quantity indicia of manipulation differ markedly from the effects of other
unusual events in futures markets. Under the assumption that historical
price and quantity data represent a sample of competitive outcomes drawn
from the same universe of underlying conditions as those prevailing during
an alleged manipulative episode, an investigator can employ classical
statistical techniques to determine the likelihood that the prices and
quantities observed during tis episode were in fact consistent with
competition. If the estimated probability is small, there is strong evidence
that some traders have exercised market power. This permits the
investigator to proceed to Question 2 and determine who exercised this
power.
2. Answenng Question 2
The analysis of causation in Part IV notes that courts and commissions
have attempted to determine whether a particular trader had the ability to
influence market price and that this has led to considerable confusion and
153. See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text (setting forth five implications of
manipulation).
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misunderstanding. 54 In particular, this standard requires a detailed
understanding of costs that are difficult, if not impossible, for ex post
adjudicators to calculate. Fortunately, the analysis in Part III identifies
several actions that a large trader must take in order to exercise market
power.155 It is possible, therefore, to replace a standard that requires the
determination of ability to exercise market power (a difficult task that
requires knowledge that is extremely costly to collect) with a standard that
relies upon the identification of the accused's readily observable conduct.
Specifically, recall that a long manipulator:
1. Stops an abnormally large number of deliveries, but liquidates a
substantial proportion of his position.
2. Stops a large fraction of deliveries relative to the total number of
deliveries made.
3. Liquidates his futures position at a price that exceeds the value of
the units delivered to him.
Each of these implications is testable, although an investigator must
exercise care in doing so. First consider Implication 1. It is necessary to
establish a standard in order to test whether the number of deliveries a long
takes is large or small. This standard should correct for the identity of the
trader and his past behavior, whether or not he owns a substantial portion
of the deliverable unbeknownst to shorts, and for certain conditions that
may affect the marginal cost of delivery
A trader's type and past behavior are relevant because some traders
(especially commercial traders and some arbitragers) take delivery as a part
of their normal commercial operations. An investigator should therefore
compare the number of deliveries stopped by the accused trader with
(1) the number of deliveries taken concurrently (i.e., at the time of the
alleged manipulation) by other traders of a similar type (e.g., compare an
alleged commercial manipulator with other commercials or an alleged arbi-
trageur manipulator with other arbitragers) and (2) the number of deliveries
taken by traders of a similar type during previous delivery periods.
In making the second comparison in particular, it is necessary to
correct for certain factors that influence the economics of taking delivery
These include: contract month (e.g., there are more corn deliveries in
154. See supra part IV.B.2.
155. See supra part I.
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December than July), stocks on hand in the delivery market, and (especial-
ly) futures spreads-the annualized percentage difference between the price
of the deferred future and the expiring futures price net of the cost of
storage and the time value of money The futures spread is motivated by
the fact that it is much costlier to take delivery and hold inventories when
a market is "inverted" (i.e., the difference is a large negative number)
rather than when it is at "full carry " In a full carry market, the futures
price exceeds the spot price by the costs of storing inventory until the
expiration of the future. In such a market, the trader taking delivery can
short the deferred future and receive a payment sufficient to cover the costs
of storage and forgone interest that the trader incurs before he can deliver
against the deferred contract. If the market is not at full carry, however,
the trader suffers a loss from holding inventory until the expiration of the
deferred contract.
This discussion suggests testing a regression model of delivery
behavior. Specifically, the number of deliveries taken by a commercial
trader, D, is a function of: the contract month, C,, a dummy variable equal
to 1 in month i and 0 in other months, where i =1, n, and n is the
number of delivery months in a year; stocks on hand in the delivery
market, S; and the return to holding inventory, R, where R =FD-FE-c-rFE,
and FD is the deferred futures price, FE is the expiring future, c is the
dollar cost of storing inventory until the expiration of the deferred contract,
and rFE is the dollar value of interest forgone on the value of the commodi-
ty from the expiration of the nearby contract to the expiration of the
deferred contract. Formally, one estimates the model:
D=a+blC1 + +bn-lCn_ +bsS+bRR+e
where e is a random error term, and the bi are parameters.
Given historical data on deliveries taken by traders of the same type
as the mampulator and assuming competitive behavior during the sample
period, one can estimate the parameters of this model (including the
variance of the error) over the sample period, calculate the fitted value of
D for the period of the alleged manipulation, and determine whether the
fitted value is statistically significantly different from the value observed
during the delivery period in question. If the probability that the difference
between the fitted and observed values (estimated by using the relevant
values for the Cs, R, and S) is consistent with competition is sufficiently
small, an investigator can infer manipulative conduct.
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The primary potential obstacle in implementing this test is data
availability This test requires historical data on the number of deliveries
taken by this trader or other similar traders in the past. These data are not
publicly available, and an investigator would probably have to secure them
by competitive means; the data may be especially difficult to acquire from
those other than the accused.
This problem does not affect tests of the other implications as
seriously In particular, an investigator can rely upon publicly available
price data and information on the alleged manipulator's postexpiration
actions.
Indeed, the information used to verify the burying the body effect, and
the spread between spot and deferred futures prices, relate directly to this
issue. The finding of a substantial spot price decline in the delivery market
(especially relative to other prices) at the end of an alleged anticipated
squeeze implies a significant difference between liquidation prices and the
value of the commodity received via delivery An anomalous futures
spread has a similar implication. In fact, although an accused manipulator
may try to argue that the decline in the spot price was unexpected (i.e., he
expected the price of the deliverable after contract expiration approximately
to equal the price at which he liquidated futures contracts), this claim is
unpersuasive if the deferred futures price (which is a publicly available
measure of the expected spot price) is depressed.
Similarly, in a "surprise" squeeze, a disparity between the price at
which an accused manipulator sells futures contracts and contemporaneous
spot bids is strongly consistent with the existence of a manipulation; the
spot bids represent an independent measure of the true value of the
commodity What if the accused alleges that the price pattern resulted from
other traders' incorrect perceptions of his intentions? Assuming this is
true, the alleged manipulator would consider the postdelivery spot price too
low and should purchase deferred futures, spot supplies, or both at that
time. Thus, this potential defense is contradicted if he sells, rather than
buys, the commodity after the manipulation.
In conclusion, it is possible to determine whether a particular trader
has behaved in a mampulative fashion by comparing the number of
deliveries that the trader takes to that trader's past performance and the
performance of other traders, with a correction for various factors that
affect the delivery calculus. It is also very informative to compare the
value of the deliveries the trader takes relative to the price at which the
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trader liquidates futures contracts. 156 This analysis does not require an
estimation of potentially amorphous quantities like the deliverable supply
Instead of estimating the ability of a trader to manipulate, the proposed
method examines whether the trader's conduct mimics that predicted by the
model of manipulation. If it does, and one can rule out alternative
explanations of the accused trader's conduct, the probability of mistakenly
assigning liability to the trader is very small. I next examine criteria for
evaluating the accused trader's possible excuses for his conduct.
3. Answenng Question 3
The objective of this final question is to address an alleged mampula-
tor's potential defenses. 157  In particular, the alleged manipulator may
argue that his actions were not motivated by a desire to manipulate the
market, but instead were the product of some legitimate strategy The
alternative rationales include: (1) a desire to obtain the physical commodity
for commercial purposes; (2) legitimate speculation; (3) hedging; (4) tax
considerations; and (5) stupidity or ignorance.
Each alternative rationale has observable implications that differ from
the implications, of manipulative conduct. Thus, one can reliably test the
validity of the claims of a suspected manipulator by companng us actual
conduct to that implied by the manipulation theory and that implied by the
theory advanced as a defense. I consider each rationale in turn.
156. It is possible to use other information to improve this analysis. Specifically, an
accused manipulator may claim that the actions of other long traders, rather than his own
actions, caused the price and quantity anomalies. Data on market share are directly relevant
in this case.
157 The analysis in this section bears some similarities to that of Friedman and Perdue.
See generally Friedman, supra note 67; Perdue, supra note 54. Each proposes that the test
of manipulative intent should be: Would the accused trader behave as observed but for the
desire to influence price? Friedman's proposed methodology for answering this question
implicitly requires a knowledge of the competitive price. He asks whether the shorts submit
to the demands of a large trader only because there are stiffer penalties for default on futures
contracts than there are for failure to perform under contracts governed by the Uniform
Commercial Code. In order to answer this question, Friedman poses another: Would shorts
choose to default if the only penalties for doing so were liquidated damages? In order to
calculate these damages, it is necessary to know the competitive price. Conversely, the
methodology proposed in this section permits answering the question without knowing the
competitive price. Therefore, the criteria established here can be implemented.
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Because manipulators stand for excessively large numbers of
deliveries, some claim that their actions were motivated by a need to obtain
the cash commodity for commercial reasons. As noted in Part III,
however, successful frictional manipulators also liquidate large numbers of
contracts. An accused manipulator must therefore explain why he did both.
In order for such behavior to be consistent with competitive, price-taking,
behavior, the marginal value of a delivery taken, its price, must necessarily
equal the liquidation price on the marginal contract."I
If an investigator documents a burying the body effect, however, the
accused cannot claim that he chose the number of deliveries in order to
minimize the cost of acquiring the physical commodity This is true
because the burying the body effect implies that the value of the marginal
contract liquidation exceeded the value of the marginal delivery at contract
expiration. This is inconsistent with competitive, price-taking, behavior.
Moreover, if the long takes deliveries to satisfy an existing sales
commitment-a short position in the cash or futures markets-this
"defense" actually undermines the accused manipulator's case if he
liquidates some contracts as well. The primary cost of executing a
manipulation is the loss incurred on deliveries taken due to the burying the
body effect. That is, a manipulator takes delivery of a large amount of the
commodity which must be disposed of. A trader who has no short position
in the same commodity must sell these deliveries at a low price. In
contrast, a trader with an outstanding short position is hedged against the
price decline that results at the end of a manipulation. Thus, cetens
paribus, traders with-existing sales commitments actually find manipulation
more profitable than those without such commitments. As a result, the
158. To see why, assume the opposite. If a price-taking owner of a long position faces
a futures price of P and a value of the deliverable commodity of V, where P> V, he can
increase his wealth by selling the futures contract. Conversely, if V>P, he should take
another delivery A price-taking, competitive, trader cannot be in equilibrium, therefore,
unless P=V
The evidence presented in Indiana Farm Bureau provides a clear-cut case of the
importance of this fact. Respondent Johnston in that case stated thathe preferred to liquidate
futures contracts at a price of $3.80 per bushel rather than take delivery at that price because
after the market closed, the "corn would be worth a dollar a bushel less." Indiana Farm
Bureau Coop. Ass'n., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 21,796,
at 27,308 (Dec. 17, 1982). Because Johnston took substantial deliveries at prices greater than
$2.80 per bushel, id., this statement is inconsistent with the notion that the Bureau was acting
as a price taker in the July 1973 corn futures contract.
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existence of such commitments is less a defense against a charge of
manipulation than an inducement to execute one.
Other information may also disprove an accused squeezer's claim that
the futures market was the cheap source of the cash commodity In
particular, bids on the cash market that are lower than the futures price are
strong evidence that there are cheaper sources of the deliverable. This is
particularly true if the accused is one of the bidders, as in Indiana Farm
Bureau. 59 Moreover, if the fraction of the open futures position that the
trader owns grows as expiration approaches, his claim is open to serious
question. The change in market share indicates that his behavior is
opposite that of other longs-he is buying, or holding a long position, while
they are actively selling. To explain this behavior, the accused manipulator
must demonstrate why the futures market is a cheaper source of cash
supplies for him, but not for the longs who liquidate.
Rational competitive speculation also requires an equation of the price
at which the trader liquidates the marginal contract and the value of the
marginal delivery To explain his behavior as the product of a speculative
strategy, an accused manipulator must argue that he valued the physical
commodity at the high liquidation price he accepted. The accused
manipulator must argue that the expiring futures price is cheap relative to
prices at other locations and deferred futures prices. Again, if there is a
large and rapid spot price decline in the delivery market, a burying the
body effect, the failure of the trader topurchase more of the spot commodi-
ty contradicts his assertion that the expiring futures price was cheap." 6
Similarly, sale of the cash commodity or sale of deferred futures contracts
is inconsistent with the speculative rationale. Again, there are several
behavioral implications of the assertion of a speculative motive, and an
159 See id. at 27,280. Sometimes (as occurred in the Ferruzzi episode), the large long
does not bid in the delivery market, but instead bids in some other market. In this case, it
is necessary to calculate the cost of acquiring supplies in the delivery market (the futures
price) plus the cost of transporting the delivered commodity to the place where the long is
bidding. If this so called "delivery value" exceeds the cash bid, one can infer that the futures
market is not the cheap source of the cash commodity
160. As an example, assume that the futures price atcontract expiration equaled 10. This
equals the value of a delivery by assumption; taking the trader's justification at face value
implies that the trader is willing to pay 10 for a unit of the physical commodity when trading
ends. Immediately after trading ends, the price falls to nine. If the trader's marginal
willingness to pay at contract expiration was 10, the trader should purchase the commodity
at the lower price.
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investigator can compare these implications with the trader's observed
conduct.
Moreover, if an investigator establishes relative price distortions, then
an accused manipulator bought the commodity that was atypically dear.
The accused manipulator purchased the deliverable commodity when it was
unusually expensive relative to the same commodity at other times and
other locations and to other commodities. Because the old speculative
adage is "buy cheap and sell dear," any accused manipulator will find it
extraordinarily difficult to provide an explanation for such behavior. This
is especially true if his market share grew as the contract neared expiration
because this suggests that other traders disagreed with his claimed
rationale.
Some traders may also claim that their large positions are hedges;
speculators who do not trade on the cash market cannot employ this
rationale. Hedging is a potentially plausible explanation long before
contract expiration, but hedging is far less credible immediately before the
end of trading. The expiring future can hedge only those cash market
transactions that take place in the time remaining before the end of trading.
Thus, as trading in a particular contract nears its end, a trader with a large
long futures position must be able to show that he has a fixed price sales
commitment of approximately the same size as the futures position and that
the long plans to acquire the commodity to meet that commitment prior to
the end of the futures trading. This rationale is patently ridiculous if the
long holds a substantial position to the very end of trading. Moreover, if
the long liquidates earlier, his behavior provides an acid test for his
motives. Specifically, in order for the hedging rationale to withstand
scrutiny, it must be the case that prior to or immediately following the
liquidation, the trader acquires the cash commodity in an amount approxi-
mately equal to the size of his futures position. A failure to do so, or sales
of the cash commodity on the spot market, contradicts the hedging
rationale.
Furthermore, as in the speculative explanation, the accused manipula-
tor can be questioned closely about the reasonableness of his actions.
Again, given a wide spread between the expiring and deferred futures, a
legitimate long hedger could reduce his hedge costs by selling the expiring
contract at a high price and buying the deferred future at a low price. A
trader's failure to do so is strongly consistent with manipulative intent.
In one manipulation case, the defendants, N. Bunker Hunt, W Herbert
Hunt, and Lamar Hunt, claimed that they stood for large numbers of
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deliveries against silver futures contracts for tax purposes and that they had
no intent to manipulate the market. 61 The defendants reasoned that any
profits earned on a liquidated contract are taxed at the time the position is
closed. 62 Profits earned on the sale of a commodity acquired by taking
delivery on a futures contract are not taxable until the commodity is sold;
a trader can defer taxes for as long as the trader desires. Deferring taxes
is valuable if interest rates are positive. Deferral is especially beneficial to
a trader if short-term gains are taxed at a higher rate than long term gains,
as was the case in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
The tax advantages of taking delivery do not necessarily imply that a
trader has not manipulated a market if he takes a large number of
deliveries. If a trader does not exert market power, he should either
liquidate his entire position or take delivery on his entire position. This is
true because if a trader does not exert market power, the spot and futures
prices do not depend upon the number of contracts he liquidates. Thus, if
prices are such that tax considerations imply that the trader is better off
taking delivery on one contract, he should take delivery upon all of them.
Tax considerations, therefore, do not explain why a competitive trader
would liquidate some contracts and take delivery on others. As a result,
even if these tax considerations are relevant, a trader who both liquidates
contracts and accepts deliveries acts like a trader who exerts market power.
Moreover, if a trader exercises market power, the advantages of
deferring taxation may indeed induce him to take more deliveries than an
untaxed trader would. However, this should not excuse his actions because
the additional deliveries merely exacerbate the distortions resulting from
the exercise of market power. That is, cetens paribus, a taxable trader
who manipulates does more damage than a nontaxable one. Because the
objective of manipulation law is to reduce the frequency and intensity of
price and quantity distortions, it would be perverse indeed to allow a
manipulator to use the tax advantages of taking delivery to escape penalty
The CEA states that it is unlawful to corner the market; 63 it does not say
161. Minpeco, S.A. v ContiCommodity Servs., Inc., 673 F Supp. 684, 698 (S.D.N.Y
1987). It should be noted that the evidence supporting the assertion that the Hunts engaged
in a true market power manipulation was very weak. It is still worth discussing the possible
defense of tax considerations, however, because the defense could be employed in a market
power manipulation case in order to rationalize the taking of large numbers of deliveries.
162. See id.
163. 7 U.S.C. § 7(4) (Supp. V 1993).
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that it is unlawful for a trader to run a corner unless the corner can reduce
the trader's taxes.
When all else fails, a manipulator may claim stupidity or ignorance.
It is impossible to refute definitively either explanation using reasoning
similar to that used heretofore. If the accused is an experienced or
sophisticated trader, however, such a defense is easily dismissed.
C. Summary and Conclusions
A trader who exercises market power undertakes certain readily
observed actions. These actions, in turn, have pronounced and well-
defined effects on prices and quantities. By testing these implications of
manipulative conduct, therefore, it is possible to determine whether an
observed set of prices and the actions of a particular trader are consistent
with competitive behavior. Thus, when properly understood, manipulation
is not "unprosecutable." Rejection of this hypothesis with a high degree of
confidence implies that it is very likely that a trader exerted market power.
Moreover, examination of an accused trader's actions allows a fact finder
to determine whether the trader exercised this power. The existence of an
offense is readily identified, and manipulative conduct is readily distin-
guished from competitive conduct.
VL Conclusion
This Article has (1) examined the state of commodity market
manipulation law and (2) proposed a new set of tests that promises to
address many of the defects in the existing decisions in manipulation cases.
Two findings deserve emphasis.
First, the existing case law on manipulation is extraordinarily misguid-
ed. In particular, many of its precepts are based on a complete misunder-
standing of the economics of manipulation. In its current state, the law is
less a deterrent to mampulators than an invitation to them.
Second, this state of affairs is redeemable. It is possible to assign the
liability for manipulative conduct with a considerable degree of precision
by employing a set of criteria firmly grounded in an understanding of the
economics of manipulation. A corner leaves a trail that is readily followed
to its source if one recognizes the telltale markers-price effects, quantity
effects, and trader conduct. Straightforward application of statistical
inference techniques allows an adjudicator to deternune ex post whether a
market was manipulated and who manipulated it with a high degree of
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precision. Thus, I strongly concur with Richard Friedman's statement that
by asking and answering the right questions-questions motivated by a
clear understanding of the predictable effects of the offense-courts can
effectively detect and deter mampulation. '4 If they do so, courts will
make dracoman ex ante restrictions on trader conduct that demoralize
legitimate trader conduct unnecessary
164. See supra text accompanying note 140 (quoting Friedman's statement).
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